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CONSTITUTIONAL OUTLINES OF PUBLIC HEALTH'S
"NEW WORLD ORDER"
David P. Fidler*
INTRODUCTION

In previous scholarship, I argued that containment of the 2003 outbreak of
severe acute respiratory syndrome ("SARS") revealed the emergence of a new
way of governing global infectious disease threats.1 The responses, good and
bad, to the unprecedented outbreak of avian influenza A ("H5N1") in Asia in
2004 reinforce my argument that governance of global infectious disease threats
has entered a new phase. 2 In this article, I assert that this new governance
context exhibits "constitutional outlines" that provide substance and structure to
public health's "new world order." These outlines parallel governance features
more commonly associated with constitutional structures than international
ones.
The appearance of these constitutional outlines does not mean that "world
health government" has arrived. The outlines bear the imprint of the anarchical
conditions characterizing international relations. This article explores, however,
how governance of public health has transcended previous models and
approaches through the development of features that parallel how constitutional
frameworks structure public health governance. 3 After sketching these
constitutional outlines, I reflect on their implications for public health
governance, 4 comment on potential deficiencies and vulnerabilities in this

Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of Law,
Bloomington; Senior Scholar, Center for the Law and Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns
Hopkins Universities. This Article was written during the author's time as a Visiting Senior Research
Scholar at the Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford. The author thanks Professors
Jeffrey Dunoff and Scott Burris of Temple University Beasley School of Law for inviting him to
participate in the symposium on SARS, Public Health, and Global Governance.
1. David P. Fidler, SARS: Political Pathologyof the FirstPost-Westphalian Pathogen, 31 J. LAW,
MED. & ETHICS 485, 486-90 (2003); DAVID P. FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE
GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE 6,42-48 (2004).
2. This Article does not comprehensively analyze the avian influenza outbreak but refers to
policy responses to it at appropriate points in the argument. For an overview of the international legal
implications of avian influenza, see David P. Fidler, Global Outbreak of Avian Influenza A (H5NI)
and International Law, American Society of International Law Insights (Jan. 2004), at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh125.htm.
3. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the similarities between transformations in public health
governance in the United States and in international relations.
4. See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of the constitutional outlines of public health governance.
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6
emerging structure, 5 and offer some thoughts on prospects for the new regime.

I. INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE

A. Anarchy and Hierarchy
International and constitutional governance have traditionally had different
purposes. International governance organizes and regulates political, economic,
and social interactions among independent, sovereign states. Constitutional
governance organizes and regulates political, economic, and social affairs within
a single political entity, typically the sovereign state. International governance
manages power in anarchy; constitutional governance establishes a hierarchy of
power.
Rhetoric and concepts from constitutional governance have sometimes been
applied to international relations, as illustrated by arguments that the Covenant
of the League of Nations or the United Nations Charter represents a
"constitution" for world affairs. 7 The constitutional structures that provide the
closest analogies to international politics are confederal or federal systems,
which allocate sovereignty hierarchically among national and sub-national units.
Historically, however, confederal or federal constitutional structures have
not provided much utility for analyzing sovereign states interacting in a condition
of anarchy. The federal constitutional system of the United States provided, for
example, little insight into how Cold War intergovernmental relations functioned
because the underlying political contexts (hierarchy v. anarchy) differed.
B. Allocating Power Horizontally and Vertically
Conceptually, international and constitutional governance allocate political
power in different ways. Both involve horizontal and vertical allocations of
power, but each has a distinct combination of such allocations. International
governance's primary allocation of power is horizontal among political units
(states) that are formally equal. This horizontal allocation of power produces
the international system, the dynamics of which center on the anarchical
International governance's secondary
interactions of sovereign states.8
5. See infra Part IV.D for a discussion of the weaknesses in public health's new world order
stemming from the anarchical environment of international relations.
6. See infra Part V suggesting that prospects for global health governance will be determined by
the progress achieved under the public health preparedness and response function.
7. Martti Koskenniemi, What Is International Law For?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 109
(Malcom D. Evans ed., 2003) (referring to inter-war arguments that the Covenant of the League of
Nations was "a constitution of the world"). On the use of constitutional concepts to analyze
international relations, see generally Laurence R. Helfer, ConstitutionalAnalogies in the International
Legal System, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 193 (2003).
8. See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 910 (3d ed. 1977) (defining an international system as forming "when two or more states have sufficient
contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to
behave-at least in some measure-as parts of a whole").
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allocation of power is vertical, which traditionally involved a political hierarchy
reflecting the distribution of material power and the special role great powers
play in anarchical political systems.
Constitutional governance's primary allocation of power is vertical among
different levels of governance within one political unit. Thus, the U.S.
Constitution allocates the sovereign power of the United States between the
federal government and the states of the Union. Such vertical allocation of
power creates a legal hierarchy that establishes what level of government has
primacy in exercising sovereignty. Constitutional governance's secondary
allocation of power is horizontal and affects branches of government within
particular levels of the hierarchy. The U.S. Constitution's separation of powers
and checks and balances horizontally allocates power within the federal level of
government.
The horizontal allocation of power achieved through international
governance presumes (at least theoretically) that each state functions as an
autonomous governance unit. The vertical allocation of power in constitutional
governance creates interdependent governance entities relating in a functional
hierarchy. In federal systems, constitutions assign certain governance functions
to the national government (e.g., providing for the common defense), subnational governments (e.g., education), and individual citizens (e.g., defending a
bill of rights against government encroachment).
Analogies to constitutional governance in international relations often
appear in connection with international institutions. 9 These analogies are made
because such institutions add a "vertical" dimension to international governance
through the creation of political entities that fulfill specific governance functions.
For example, under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council is
legally competent to authorize the use of force in situations not involving selfdefense. 10 Similarly, references to constitutional governance in international
relations appear in advocacy for the "international bill of human rights,"
allegedly composed of the corpus of fundamental human rights in international
11
law.
International institutions and international human rights law disaggregate
sovereignty on the international plane, echoing vertical allocations of
governance power in constitutional structures. Historically, however, these
echoes have ranged from faint to inaudible in international relations. 12 By and
large, states created international institutions to help calibrate the horizontal
allocation of power structured by international governance. As the international
9. See, e.g., Heifer, supra note 7, at 194-97 (discussing benefits and detriments of comparing
constitutional and international governance).
10. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39,42.
11. On the "international bill of human rights," see U.N. Office of the High Commission for
Human Rights, The International Bill of Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1) (June 1996),
availableat http://www.unhchr.ch/htmil/menu6/2/fs2.htm.

12. One exception is the creation of the European Community, which according to Heifer, has
"evolved into a quasi-federal system with legislative, judicial, and executive branches that exercise
significant lawmaking, adjudicative, and enforcement powers .. " Heifer, supra note 7, at 199.
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relations theory of institutionalism argues, international institutions reflect
rather than rearrange the structural nature of international relations.1 3 . In terms
of human rights, concerns about the state of compliance with international
human rights law suggest that the role of individual rights in constitutional
governance has, for the most part, eluded the human rights movement in
14
international relations.
Faint and inaudible echoes of constitutional governance in international
affairs owe much to the privileges accorded sovereignty by international
governance. Historically, states have only grudgingly limited their sovereignty
vis-A-vis other states through international regimes. Similarly, principles that
support sovereignty, such as the principle of nonintervention, have blunted the
human rights effort to disaggregate sovereignty vertically as achieved in
constitutional governance.
My thesis that public health governance in the post-SARS world exhibits
"constitutional outlines" means that such governance has moved beyond faint
and inaudible echoes of constitutionalism in the world politics of public health.
To sustain this argument, I need to demonstrate that public health governance
exhibits new characteristics that resonate more with constitutional than
international governance. The constitutional outlines represent the emergence
of governance functions that reflect a vertical reallocation of power in the realm
of global public health.
II. FEDERALIZATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNANCE

A. Public Health and the U.S. Constitution
Because federal constitutional structures provide the appropriate
frameworks with which to analyze governance in international relations, I sketch
federal public health functions that arise under the U.S. Constitution and
describe how the exercise of these functions now dominate public health
governance in the United States. Subsequent parts of the article trace the
15
emergence of similar functions outside sovereign states in global public health.
These functions represent the "constitutional outlines" of public health's new
world order.
Under.the U.S. Constitution, the states of the Union rather than the federal
government possess governance authority for public health. 16 The federal
13. For a discussion on institutionalism, see Robert 0. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise
of InstitutionalistTheory, 20 INT'L SECURITY 39, 41-42 (1995).

14. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE
L.J. 1935 (2002) (discussing the association between human rights treaties and countries' human rights
practices).
15. See infra Part IV for a discussion of how U.S. and international public health governance hint
at "constitutional outlines" for global health governance.
16. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 25-59

(2001) (analyzing how federalism structures governance of public health in the United States).
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government has no express enumerated powers on public health. Thus, in the
U.S. Constitution's vertical allocation, public health sovereignty formally resides
with the states. The federal government is, however, a significant actor in public
health governance because the exercise of its enumerated powers affects public
health in many ways.
Despite having no express constitutional powers for public health, the
federal government developed important public health governance functions.
The development of these functions highlights the growing importance of the
federal government in public health. In essence, the increasing importance.of
these functions represents a de facto reallocation of power, which suggests the
emergence of a radically different context for public health governance.
B. Public Health and National Security
The U.S. Constitution assigns responsibility for providing national security
to the federal government. 17 Defending the nation and promoting its interests
abroad represent tasks no individual state could fulfill. Constitutional power for
this purpose belonged at the federal level, where collective action vis-A-vis other
countries could be effectively managed. Historically, public health has not
featured prominently as an element of the federal government's exercise of its
national security powers. Similarly, with public health authority residing in the
states, the pursuit of public health in the constitutional system did not reflect
national security objectives.
Public health arose as a national security issue in connection with infectious
disease threats to U.S. military forces. The federal government sought to
mitigate costs pathogenic microbes inflicted on U.S. military personnel during
overseas campaigns and missions (e.g., the U.S. Army's anti-yellow fever efforts
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). The federal government
also concerned itself with the threat posed to U.S. national security by the
18
development and use of biological weapons by potential adversaries.
These limited contexts in which national security policy reflected public
health concerns fell entirely within the allocation of powers in the U.S.
Constitution. The past decade has witnessed, however, a revolution in the
relationship between public health and national security. 19 This revolution has
17. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (indicating that one of the purposes for' establishing the
Constitution was to "provide for the common defence"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-16 (granting
Congress the power to declare war, raise and support army and naval forces, and to make rules
regulating military forces); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, 2 (vesting the President with the powers of
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and of negotiating treaties and appointing ambassadors).
18. See, e.g., Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65
[hereinafter Geneva Protocol] (ratified, in 1975, to bind the United States to the Protocol);
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S
163 (recognizing the United States' continued commitment to the Geneva Protocol and the
elimination of the risks to human kind posed by the use of biological agents and toxins as weapons).
19. See generally David P. Fidler, Public Health and National Security in the Global Age:
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increased the public health importance of the federal government's national
security powers. As public health more broadly has fallen under national
security scrutiny, the constitutional function of the federal government in the
public health governance has enlarged.
The federal government's security function in public health has arisen in
response to three threats, two of which have shifted constitutional responsibility
for public health from state governments to the federal government. The first
threat is bioterrorism, which has skyrocketed as a policy concern in the last
decade. The threat of biological attack against the U.S. homeland has made the
quality of public health systems at the state level a national security issue. As a
result, the federal government has intervened in the public health sphere in
unprecedented ways, 20 making the federal government, rather than the states,
the constitutional engine of public health governance.
The second threat involves naturally occurring infectious diseases and the
dangers they pose to U.S. security. In another unprecedented policy shift, the
United States in the 1990s, began to view emerging and reemerging infectious
diseases, propelled by the forces of globalization, as a threat to U.S. public
health, economic welfare, and national security. 21 This shift continued in the
early twenty-first century, accelerated by events such as the SARS and avian
influenza crises. The challenge of responding to globalized infectious diseases
mandates federal control because the scale and nature of this threat is beyond
the capability of any individual state of the Union.
The threats from bioterrorism and naturally occurring infectious diseases
have expanded the federal government's constitutional functions synergistically.
Defense against both threats requires a robust national public health system.
The Constitution's allocation of public health power to states creates a
patchwork system vulnerable at many points to the disease threats faced by the
United States. Thus, the responsibility for shoring up the country's public health
defenses falls to the federal government because of the scale and nature of the
problem.
The third threat in the national security context concerns how infectious
disease epidemics in foreign countries threaten U.S. national security and foreign
policy interests. For example, in the 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. government

Infectious Diseases, Bioterrorism,and Realpolitik,35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 787 (2003) (analyzing
the connection between public health and national security).
20. See, e.g., Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201) (improving the federal government's
ability to effectively deal with bioterrorism and public health emergencies); U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Protecting Americans: Smallpox Vaccination Policy (Dec. 13, 2002) (detailing
the United States' plan for reacting to the threat of a smallpox attack on the American people),
availableat http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/pdf/vaccination-program-statement.pdf.
21. See, e.g., NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, THE GLOBAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREAT
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, National Intelligence Estimate 99-17D, at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/nie/report/nie99-17d.html (Jan. 2000) (detailing the reemergence of
"the growing global infectious disease threat" as part of a "Presidential Decision Directive calling for a
more focused U.S. policy on infectious diseases").
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viewed the spread of the human immunodeficiency virus and the acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome ("HIV/AIDS") epidemic in the developing world
as a national security threat because of its potential to contribute to state failure
and regional instability. 22 Because foreign-source threats to national security
and foreign policy are federal constitutional domains, this threat does not
produce the shift in constitutional functions triggered by bioterrorism and
invasion by naturally occurring infectious diseases. The moves made by the
federal government to respond to infectious disease problems overseas deepen,
however, the federal government's growing constitutional dominance of public
health.
C. Public Health and Commerce
The U.S. Constitution assigns responsibility for regulating interstate
commerce and commerce with foreign nations to the federal government.23 As
with national security, such allocation of sovereignty makes sense because no
individual state could shoulder these endeavors. The federal government's
commerce powers have been a basis for federal action in connection with public
health in two ways.
First, the Commerce Clause is a limitation on state-level public health
governance. Federal courts have often reviewed state health measures that
affect interstate commerce. 24 The constitutional power of the individual states to
exercise their public health sovereignty is not absolute, but is embedded in a
constitutional system in which free flows of commerce is a structural principle.
The Commerce Clause gives the federal government the constitutional function
of balancing interstate commerce and the public health sovereignty of the states
of the Union.
Second, the Commerce Clause empowered the federal government to
legislate to address public health threats arising from interstate and international
commerce. Foreign and interstate commerce can create negative health
externalities through widespread trade in health-damaging products that the
federal government can address legislatively under the Commerce Clause. 25 As
the speed, scale, and volume of interstate and foreign commerce has increased,
the public health importance of the Commerce Clause has likewise increased
because, again, the nature of the public health problem supersedes the
22. For discussion of how the Bush administration sees HIV/AIDS as a threat to U.S. interests,
see David P. Fidler, Fightingthe Axis of Illness: Human Rights, HIV/AIDS, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 17
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 99, 123-26 (2004).

3 (assigning to Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
foreign Nations, and among the several States").
24. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (holding that
"the incantation of a purpose to promote the public health or safety does not insulate a state law from
Commerce Clause attack. Regulations designed for that salutary purpose nevertheless may further
the purpose so marginally, and interfere with commerce so substantially, as to be invalid under the
Commerce Clause.").
25. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (West 2003)
(regulating food, drugs, and cosmetics sold within the United States).
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constitutional powers allocated to the individual states. The globalization of
trade, investment, and markets highlights why the federal government's
constitutional function of regulating commerce has become critical for protecting
public health in the United States.
D. PublicHealth Preparednessand Response
The U.S. Constitution's allocation of public health sovereignty to the states
of the Union assigns responsibility for public health preparedness and response
to such states. State and local governments provide the bulk of personnel and
resources devoted to public health in the United States.
The federal
government's role in public health preparedness and response has been to
support state-level efforts, particularly with respect to handling problems that
threaten to overwhelm state capacities (e.g., federal emergency management
support during natural disasters). 26 This support role is consistent with the
federal government's formal subordination in the constitutional system for
public health.
The enlargement of the federal government's constitutional functions for
public health under its national security and commerce powers caused the
federal government's responsibilities for public health preparedness and
response likewise to expand. Congressional legislation and appropriations have
significantly increased in the last five years, 27 making the federal government the
primary influence on preparedness and response efforts today. This shift in the
federal preparedness and response function flows from the rise of public health
as an issue for national security and the regulation of globalized commerce.
Public health preparedness and response can no longer constitutionally be
considered a function primarily of state governments.
The increased constitutional importance of the federal preparedness and
response function manifests itself in federal efforts to strengthen both state and
federal public health capabilities. The Constitution's allocation of public health
sovereignty to the individual states has created a public health structure marked
by federalism. Thus, robust federal activity on public health preparedness and
response cannot ignore problems that exist at the state level. Federal leadership
on preparedness and response is, however, transforming the traditional
distribution of public health power into one in which the federal government
plays the more decisive and powerful constitutional role.

26. See, e.g., Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §
5121 et seq. (West 2000) (establishing system for federal disaster relief and emergency assistance to the
states).
27. Press Release, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, President's Budget Includes $274
Million to Further Improve Nation's Bio-Surveillance Capabilities (Jan. 29, 2004) (stating that "[slince
September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration has spent or budgeted $12.9 billion to prepare and
protect the nation from a bioterror attack, including $5.2 billion in the Fiscal Year 2004 budget. This is
15 times the $305 million spent in Fiscal Year 2001."), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/
display?theme=34&content=3091.
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E. Public Health and Individual Rights
The Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution has always given the federal
government the constitutional function of scrutinizing public health actions by
government for compliance with constitutionally protected rights. Since the
early twentieth century, federal courts have upheld and struck down state
government public health actions that affected rights protected by the
Constitution. 28 The federal government's constitutional function with respect to
individual rights demonstrates that the allocation of public health sovereignty to
state governments is embedded in a constitutional system in which protection of
civil and political rights is a bedrock principle.
Well before the SARS outbreak, commentators observed how protection of
civil and political rights significantly increased in public health over the course of
the twentieth century. 29 The heightened importance of the protection of rights in
connection with public health appeared in the United States in the HIV/AIDS
epidemic in the 1980s, and in responses to bioterrorism and naturally occurring
infectious diseases in the 1990s and early 2000s. Although controversies erupted
concerning how to balance government action with the protection of rights in
public health contexts (e.g., privacy rights in connection with HIV/AIDS
surveillance and the use of quarantine and isolation in response to bioterrorism),
these controversies demonstrated the extent to which the federal constitutional
function of protecting fundamental human rights had become central to public
health governance in the United States.
F.Federalizationof Public Health Governance
The national security, commerce, preparedness and response, and
individual rights functions described above reveal that public health governance
in the United States today cannot be accurately described by. the formal
allocation of public health sovereignty found in the Constitution. These federal
constitutional functions, and their growing importance, reflect the federalization
of public health governance in the United States. This federalization indicates
that the relationship between public health and sovereignty in U.S. constitutional
governance has been transformed by political, economic, and technological
developments, particularly in the past fifteen years. The Constitution's vertical
allocation of public health power made state governments the primary
governance actors and the federal government a secondary player. The
federalization of public health governance has not altered the de jure allocation
of public health power, but it has changed the de facto allocation of public health
governance responsibilities so that the federal government has governance
28. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905) (holding that state compulsory
vaccination requirement for smallpox was constitutional); Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 26 (1900)
(holding that a discriminatory application of municipal quarantine regulation was unconstitutional).
29. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Blinded by Bioterrorism: Public Health and Liberty in the 21st
Century, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 33, 55 (2003) ("Almost one hundred years after Jacobson [v. Mass.],
neither medicine nor constitutional law is what it was. We now take constitutional rights much more
seriously....").
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primacy over the individual states.
The federalization of public health governance also reveals that the nature
of public health as a governance problem has changed significantly. The framers
viewed public health through the lens of the "police power," historically
exercised effectively at the most local level. 30 The expansion of federal
constitutional functions suggests that political, economic, and technological
developments have overwhelmed the Constitution's eighteenth century
conceptualization of public health governance. In terms of public health,
federalization appears increasingly necessary to achieve the constitutional
objectives of forming a more perfect union, establishing justice, insuring
domestic tranquility, providing for the common defense, promoting the general
welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty for existing and future generations
31
of Americans.
30. See Wendy E. Parmet, From Slaughter-House to Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the
Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 476, 478-80 (1996) (discussing
relationship between the police power and public health in pre-Civil War constitutional law).
31. Evidence of the federalization of public health can also be seen in the European Community
("EC"). First, EC treaties have always contained "commerce clause"-type provisions regulating the
impact of health measures on trade.

See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

(consolidated version), art. 9, 2002 OJ. (C 325) 1 (2002) [hereinafter EC TREATY] (establishing
freedom of movement of goods); EC TREATY art. 30 (prohibiting quantitative restrictions on imports
and all measures having equivalent effect). For analysis of how the EC law deals with trade-restricting
health measures, see Marco M. Slotboom, Do Public Health Measures Receive Similar Treatment in
European Community and World Trade OrganizationLaw?, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 553, 555-64 (2003).
Second, the role of EC institutions in public health has increased as the EC has developed, as
evidenced by the EC Treaty's inclusion of specific EC public health responsibilities not found in the
earlier treaties. See EC TREATY art. 152 (affirming the European community's commitment to public
health). On the EC's activities under Article 152, see Activities of the European Union: Public Health,
at http://europa.eu.int/pol/health/index-en.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Activities of the
European Union]. Third, EC-level involvement in public health preparedness and response has also
increased. See Programme of Community Action in the Field of Public Health (2003-2008) (2002)
(including in EC's public health program "boosting the ability to respond rapidly and coherently to
health threats such as the cross-border menace of HIV, new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and
pollution-related diseases"), at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cha/cll503b.htm (last visited Sept.
8, 2004). Fourth, the EC's preparedness and response function has been stimulated, in part, by
concerns about weapons of mass destruction and bioterrorism, an indication that EC public health
responsibilities have a security dimension. See Civil Protection:Report on Preparednessfor Possible
Emergencies, (2002) ("The network for the epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable
diseases in the European Union was further developed. A programme for preparedness and response
capacity in the event of attacks involving biological and chemical agents was set up. Cooperation with
third countries and international organisations was developed in the framework of health protection.
For example, the Global Health Security Action Group was set up. It enables an exchange of
information on health intervention, monitoring of diseases, the contamination of water and food
chains, and also on the supply and storage of medicines. With regard to bioterrorism, the Commission
is also cooperating with the WHO. Action taken in the pharmaceutical field will provide the civil
protection mechanism with the resources required (vaccines, medicines, etc.) in the fight against
bioterrorism."), at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leglenllvb/l128124.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2004). The
EC preparedness and response and security functions are reflected in the forthcoming creation of a
new EU institution that resembles the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. See Activities
of the European Union,supra ("For some time now, the EU has recognised that it needs to improve its
ability to protect its citizens against communicable diseases and bio-terrorism threats.... The EU is
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Though the federalization of public health governance in the United States
is dramatic, this development is not this article's main focus. My thesis concerns
Although the
public health governance beyond any single country.
federalization of public health governance forms part of public health's new
world order, an even more radical phenomenon is underway in international
relations-the globalization of public health governance. The federalization of
public health governance in the United States sets up the analysis of the
revolutionary governance developments transforming the world politics of public
health. The globalization of public health governance represents a new
constitutionalization of public health governance in the anarchical context of
international relations.
III. GLOBALIZATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH GOVERNANCE
In analyzing the SARS outbreak, I identified two contrasting governance
frameworks for addressing public health problems-Westphalian and postWestphalian public health governance. 32 I use these concepts in this article, but
in a modified form concerning post-Westphalian governance, to reflect analysis I
33
developed subsequent to my SARS-specific scholarship.
Sketching these different governance frameworks highlights changes in
public health governance beyond the sovereign state since the origins of
international health diplomacy in the mid-nineteenth century. The latest
developments in governance of public health in international relations reflect a
vertical reallocation of power above and below the sovereign state. This
reallocation of power contains features similar to. the federalization of public
health governance in the United States and encourages me to explore in Part IV
below the "constitutional outlines" produced by the globalization of public
health governance.

equipped to monitor the spread of a virus-be it SARS or just influenza-but not to act in a coordinated fashion to stop it spreading. A European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, due
to start work in 2005 and be headquartered in Sweden, will change that. By creating a central agency
to replace the current informal networking arrangements, the EU will be able to react faster-and
acting fast can make the difference between a minor outbreak and a serious epidemic."), at
http://europa.eu.int/pol/health/overviewen.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2004). Fifth, EC activities on
public health take place within a human rights framework. See EC TREATY arts. 6.1, 6.2 ("1. The
Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. 2. The Union shall
respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.").
32. See, e.g., FIDLER, supra note 1, at 21-41 (analyzing public health in the Westphalian system of
international politics); id. at 42-68 (analyzing public health in the post-Westphalian system of global
politics).
33. See David P. Fidler, Caught Between Paradiseand Power: Public Health, Pathogenic Threats,
and the Axis of Illness, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 45, 47 (2003) (noting the recent shifting of policy in the
area of public health).
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A. Westphalian Public Health Governance
As the name suggests, Westphalian public health governance reflects the
"Westphalian" system of international politics. International relations scholars
acknowledge the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 as a governance turning point
34
because it established a political structure that dominated for three centuries.
Independent, territorial states interacting in a condition of anarchy characterize
the Westphalian system. Sovereign states are the structural units of the system
and determine the nature of the anarchy in which they interact.
The Westphalian system allocates power horizontally among the system's
units and creates no superior authority to which states answer. This allocation of
power is grounded in international law and produces the concept that all
sovereign states are equal under that law. 35 This horizontal allocation generated
governance principles to guide anarchical state interactions. The central
principle is sovereignty: the state reigns supreme over the people and activities in
its territory.
Sovereignty spawns two other governance principles. First, because
sovereignty means supreme power, Westphalian governance opposes one state
intervening in the domestic affairs of other states and thus contains the principle
of nonintervention. Second, rules to govern sovereign interactions arose from
the states themselves because no supreme, law-making entity existed. In
Westphalian governance, a state was free to exercise its sovereignty as it saw fit
unless that state consented to a rule of international law that disciplined its
behavior.
The combination of the principles of sovereignty, nonintervention, and
consent-based international law produced a governance system with the
following attributes:
(1) only states were involved in governance; (2) governance primarily addressed
the mechanics of state interaction (e.g., diplomacy, war, and trade); and (3)
governance did not penetrate sovereignty to address how a government treated
its people or ruled over its territory.
The vertical allocation of power seen in the Westphalian governance was
political, rather than legal, because this allocation was based on the distribution
of power in the system. The great powers largely determined how the
Westphalian system functioned, and warfare and the balance of power were
traditional tools of great-power management of Westphalian governance.
The Westphalian governance structure had been in place two centuries
before the cross-border spread of infectious diseases became a subject of
international diplomacy in the mid-nineteenth century. Beginning in 1851, the
European great powers began developing diplomatic processes and international

. 34. See JAN AART SCHOLTE, GLOBALIZATION: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 20 (2000) (arguing
that the Peace of Westphalia "contains an early official statement of the core principles that came to
dominate world affairs during the subsequent three centuries").
35. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289-99 (5th ed. 1998).
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legal rules to facilitate cooperation on infectious diseases.3 6 For roughly the first
hundred years of such diplomacy, international cooperation on public health
conformed to the Westphalian structure and its governance principles. The
processes and rules created by the great powers primarily sought to mitigate
friction national measures designed to prevent infectious disease importation
(e.g., quarantine) created for international trade.
The characteristics of Westphalian public health governance can be found
expressed in the International Health Regulations ("IHR") promulgated by the
World Health Organization ("WHO"). 3 7 The IHR are the only set of
international legal rules binding on WHO member states concerning infectious
diseases, 38 and the IHR continue the Westphalian approach to cooperation on
infectious diseases begun in the mid-nineteenth century. The IHR are classically
Westphalian in structure and content.
The IHR's objective is "to ensure the maximum security against the
39
international spread of disease with minimal interference with world traffic.
The IHR's focus is solely on infectious diseases moving between states. The
IHR seek maximum security against the international spread of disease by
requiring governments to: (1) notify the WHO of outbreaks of diseases subject
to the IHR; and (2) maintain certain public health capabilities at ports and
airports. The IHR seek minimum interference with world traffic by regulating
the WHO member states' trade and travel restrictions against countries
experiencing outbreaks of diseases subject to the IHR.
In keeping with Westphalian governance, the IHR constitute rules of
international law created by states. The rules respect the principle of
nonintervention by addressing only aspects of infectious diseases that relate to
intercourse among states. The IHR do not address aspects of public health
governance that touch on how a government controls infectious diseases in its
territory.
The IHR's limited framework is clear from the small number of diseases
subject to its rules, currently only plague, cholera, and yellow fever.40 The small
number of diseases subject to the IHR derives from the great-power origins of
international health diplomacy. The great powers crafted rules to deal with
disease threats exogenous to their territories, which reflected "not a wish for the
general betterment of the health of the world, but the desire to protect certain
favoured (especially European) nations from contamination by their less-

36.. For analysis of this history, see generally NEVILLE M. GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR WORK (2nd ed. 1971); NORMAN HOWARD-JONES, THE SCIENTIFIC
BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL SANITARY CONFERENCES 1851-1938 (1975); DAVID P.
FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES (1999).
37. WHO, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter IHR], availableat
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/1983/9241580070.
38. WHO, GLOBAL DEFENSE AGAINST THE INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREAT 63 (M.K. Kindhauser
ed., 2002) [hereinafter WHO, GLOBAL DEFENSE].
39. IHR, supra note 37, at Foreword.
40. Id. at art. 1.
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' '41
favoured (especially Eastern) fellows.
The development of Westphalian governance should not create the
impression that public health was a high priority in international politics. Public
health ranked low as a foreign policy concern for states and became even less
important for the great powers as they integrated better public health strategies
and technologies into their domestic public health systems. Evidence of this low
priority can be seen in the IHR's history. The IHR today only deal with the
same diseases discussed at the first International Sanitary Conference in 1851,
which suggests how marginal public health governance was to international
politics. Widespread violation of the IHR by WHO member states also indicates
the unimportance of these rules to state behavior. Acknowledgements by WHO
personnel and public health experts in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and early
2000s that the IHR had not achieved their purpose underscore the low priority
WHO member states accorded this governance regime.

B. Post-WestphalianPublic Health Governance (I): IndividualRights, Human
42
Solidarity, and RedistributiveJustice
One reason why Westphalian governance generally, and the IHR
specifically, suffered neglect was the development of an alternative conception of
public health governance in the post-World War II period. The WHO
Constitution's Preamble contains the concepts animating this new governance
paradigm (see Box 1), and the key principles expressed in the Preamble are
respect for the human right to health, the importance of human solidarity on
health matters, and the need for redistributive justice to achieve the right to
health and human solidarity.
The contrast between the Preamble's conception and the Westphalian
template is striking. In many ways, the WHO Constitution's Preamble appears
to have been drafted expressly to reject Westphalian governance. The Preamble
replaces the centrality of the state with an emphasis on individual rights and the
transnational solidarity of peoples. The Preamble substitutes a focus on the right
to the highest attainable standard of health and the obligation to redistribute
resources for the limited Westphalian concern with reducing public health
burdens on trade. The Westphalian principle of nonintervention is replaced by
principles that demand scrutiny of government behavior with respect to the
health of citizens and peoples of other nations.
The WHO Constitution's Preamble promotes a vertical reallocation of
power in public health governance.
Where Westphalian public health
governance focused exclusively on states and their interactions (thus hewing
closely to the horizontal allocation of power among states), the post-Westphalian
principles in the WHO Constitution's Preamble sought to empower non-state
actors-individuals and peoples-in public health governance beyond and within

41. Norman Howard-Jones, Origins of InternationalHealth Work, BRrr. MED. J., May 6, 1950, at
1032, 1035.
42. This section is based on Fidler, Caught Between Paradiseand Power, supra note 33, at 68-72.
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the sovereign state. Recognizing the participation and claims of such non-state
actors challenged the horizontal allocation of power in the Westphalian system.
Under the Preamble's pronouncements, no longer would sovereignty and
nonintervention be sacrosanct principles. The Preamble also challenged the
Westphalian system of consent-based international law through promulgating
concepts animated by natural law ideas of fundamental rights and universal
justice.
43
Box 1. Principlesin Preamble of the WHO Constitution

Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not
merely the absence of disease or infirmity.
The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race,
religion, political belief, economic or social condition.
The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and
security and is dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and
States.
The achievement of any State in the promotion and protection of health is
of value to all.
Unequal development in different countries in the promotion of health and
control of disease, especially communicable disease, is a common danger.
Healthy development of the child is of basic importance; the ability to live
harmoniously in a changing total environment is essential to such
development.
The extension to all peoples of the benefits of medical, psychological and
related knowledge is essential to the fullest attainment of health.
Informed opinion and active co-operation on the part of the public are of
utmost importance in the improvement of the health of the people.
Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples which can
be fulfilled only by the provision of adequate health and social measures.

International

health organizations

were created

under Westphalian

43. CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (July 22, 1946), reprinted in WHO,
BASIC DOCuMENTs
1 (40th ed., 1994) [hereinafter WHO CONST.],
available at
http://policy.who.int/about/en/.
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governance to facilitate limited international cooperation on public health. The
principles contained in the WHO Constitution's Preamble gave the WHO a
more expansive purpose than international health organizations had under
Westphalian governance.
Although the substantive provisions of the
Constitution do not match the Preamble's rhetoric, 44 the Preamble's aspirations
elevated the WHO's governance significance, at least conceptually. This
elevation also represents an attempt to reallocate power vertically from
sovereign states to an international organization.
The principles in the WHO Constitution's Preamble influenced the WHO's
practical governance activities in the post-World War II period. This influence
can be seen in three developments. First, as public health technologies such as
vaccines and antibiotics improved, the WHO sought to apply such technologies
directly within states through disease control and eradication programs. 45 These
efforts surpassed in importance the traditional Westphalian task of mitigating
the burden health measures imposed on international trade.
Second, the WHO's focus shifted from tending the trade interests of the
great powers toward improving health conditions in developing countries.4 6 This
shift was consistent with the principles in the WHO Constitution's Preamble,
especially those stressing human solidarity and redistributive justice. As this
shift unfolded, international health's Westphalian link to trade dissipated,
further highlighting the effort to reallocate power vertically in order to squeeze
absolute notions of sovereignty through non-state actor claims and participation
in, and international organization leadership of, public health governance.
Third, human rights norms grew in public health governance significance in
the post-World War II period. One can sense this shift in the WHO policy by
comparing the atrophy of the IHR with the WHO's high-profile push for Health
for All, which began in the late 1970s.47 The Health for All effort rested on the
foundation that attaining the highest attainable standard of health was a

44. The only concrete duties the WHO Constitution imposes on the WHO member states are to
pay assessed financial contributions and report certain information to the WHO. WHO CONST., supra
note 43, at arts. 7, 61-63.
45. Dyna Arhin-Tenkorang & Pedro Conceiqdo, Beyond Communicable Disease Control: Health
in the Age of Globalization, in PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION
484, 486-87 (Inge Kaul et. al. eds., 2003) ("In a period of great vitality in the scientific understanding of
infectious diseases and of progress in medical technology-in vaccines for prevention and drugs for
treatment-the WHO added eliminating communicable diseases at their sources to its mandate of
containing their spread through more traditional functions of coordinating international health
regulations and serving as an information clearinghouse.").
46. See CHARLES 0. PANNENBORG, A NEW INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ORDER: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF WORLD HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE 343 (1979)
(describing WHO as discarding "in all its principal policies both the first and second world[,] almost
completely focusing on the LDC-world and enhancing the latter as a special subject of international
law").
47. See Declaration of Alma Ata of 1978, in WHO, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 2-6 (1978) (asserting that health is one of the world's most

important social goals; essential to social and
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publivcations/ 9241800011.pdf.

economic

development),

available at
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fundamental human right, a concept never recognized in Westphalian
governance.
The importance of human rights to post-Westphalian governance can also
be seen in responses to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. When HIV/AIDS emerged,
the WHO and other public health experts turned not to the traditional IHR for
guidance, but to international law on human rights. 48 Human rights law focuses
attention on how a government treats its citizens and governs its territory, and
thus embodies a vertical re-allocation of sovereignty that reduces government
power and increases that of individuals, non-state actors (e.g., non-governmental
organizations), and international organizations.
The post-Westphalian conception of public health governance advanced in
the WHO Constitution's Preamble and the development of WHO activities in
the post-World War II period contain a vision of a form of "constitutional"
governance for world health. The horizontal allocation of power at the heart of
Westphalian governance is rejected in favor of a more vertically-oriented
approach under which state sovereignty remains an important structural feature
but is subject to rights-based claims from individuals and leadership from
international organizations in pursuing health for all.
This post-Westphalian vision of global governance for public health has not,
however, fared well. Comprehensive analysis of the failure of the postWestphalianism expressed in the WHO Constitution's Preamble and WHO
policy in the post-World War II period is beyond this article's scope, but limited
observations about this failure are in order. First, the vertical -reallocation of
sovereign power from governments to non-state actors and international
organizations occurred in theory only. Protections for civil and political rights in
the U.S. Constitution have meaning because institutions-the federal courts-were
created in which rights-holders could enforce the Bill of Rights. The right to
health at the center of this post-Westphalian governance vision has never
49
benefited from effective institutional support.
Second, the vertical reallocation of sovereign power from governments to
international organizations also occurred in theory only. The WHO's formal
authority to act is severely limited under the WHO Constitution, leaving the
WHO subject to the political interests of member states and its own capacity to
develop authority and leadership. In short, the traditional horizontal allocation

48. Jonathan Mann, Human Rights and AIDS: The Future of the Pandemic, in HEALTH AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: A READER 216, 217 (Jonathan M. Mann et. al. eds., 1999) (arguing that WHO's

emphasis in the late 1980's on preventing discrimination against those infected with HIV/AIDS
constituted "the first time in history [that] preventing discrimination toward those affected by an
epidemic became an integral part of a global strategy to prevent and control an epidemic of infectious
disease").
49. For example, the only monitoring mechanism for the right to health in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted in 1966, was state reporting on progress
made in the progressive achievement of such rights. See International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 16.1,993 U.N.T.S. 3 (requiring states parties to submit "reports
on the measures which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the
rights recognized herein").
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of sovereign power was not seriously challenged by the post-Westphalian vision
contained in the WHO Constitution's Preamble and post-World War II WHO
policy. The WHO's authority and leadership also suffered in the 1980s for many
reasons, ranging for the continued growth of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the
developing world to allegations of mismanagement and corruption at WHO
headquarters.
Third, the post-Westphalian governance envisaged in the WHO
Constitution's Preamble lacked sensibilities about governance in the context of
anarchy. The Preamble's proclamations of fundamental rights, transnational
human solidarity, and universal distributive justice reject the roles that power
and interests play in international politics. The disengagement of international
health from international trade provides an example of post-Westphalian
governance moving from one extreme (i.e., Westphalian governance's
dominance by the great powers) to another (i.e., universal rights, solidarity, and
justice produced without acknowledgement of the selfish interests of states and
the role of the great powers).
C. Post-WestphalianPublic Health Governance (II): Global Health Governance
and GlobalPublic Goods for Health
A second conception of post-Westphalian governance developed in the last
fifteen years. In analyzing SARS, I focused on this post-Westphalian framework
because the global containment of SARS illustrated the power of this new
governance approach. 50 I do not repeat my previous analyses of this new postWestphalian governance framework because I explore a different thesis in this
article. For my purposes here, however, an overview of the latest postWestphalian conception governance is in order.
The global crisis in emerging and reemerging infectious diseases in the
1990s stimulated experts to rethink strategies for the global infectious disease
control. The new thinking departed from the Westphalian template and the
earlier post-Westphalian governance alternative. The new framework centered
on a new process-"global health governance"-and new substantive goals"global public goods for health" ("GPGH").
1. Global Health Governance
Westphalian public health operated on the basis of "international
governance" or governance activities undertaken by state actors directly with
each other or through intergovernmental organizations. States represented the
only legitimate governance participants. This state-centric approach dominates
the IHR: Surveillance information upon which the WHO can act under the IHR,
51
for example, can only come from governments.

50. See FIDLER, SARS. GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra note 1, at
106-55 (examining how the post-Wephalian health governance successfully contained the SARS
outbreak).
51. See WHO, GLOBAL CRISES--GLOBAL SOLUTIONS: MANAGING PUBLIC HEALTH
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The governance vision found in the WHO Constitution's Preamble, and at
the heart of WHO activity in the post-World War II period, operated on the
basis of "global governance," or governance activities involving not only states
and intergovernmental organizations but also non-state actors. The right to
health elevates individuals, at least theoretically, as governance actors in public
health within and beyond the sovereign state. The Preamble's concerns with
vulnerable populations, transnational solidarity, and distributive justice also
break with state-centric Westphalianism.
The ferment in thinking about infectious diseases in the 1990s and early
2000s stressed the need for global rather than international governance. PostCold War analyses of global health often noted the growing involvement of nonstate actors, particularly nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") and
multinational corporations ("MNCs"), in health governance. This involvement
takes two forms. First, non-state actors participate indirectly in governance by
attempting to influence national governments, international organizations, and
other non-state actors (e.g., NGOs directly seeking to change the behavior of
MNCs).
Second, non-state actors participate directly as formal actors in governance
mechanisms. NGOs have long had formal relationships with the WHO by
entering into "official relations" with the Organization. 52 Global governance
creates, however, more direct and participatory non-state actor involvement.
The best examples of this direct non-state participation are the public-private
partnerships that have multiplied rapidly in the last decade 53 and, according to
the WHO, have reshaped global public health's landscape. 54 The Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria ("Global Fund") includes, for example,
non-state actor representatives on its Board of Directors, giving non-state actors
55
direct participation in policy making on an equal footing with governments.
This type of participation differs from the more limited model of "official
EMERGENCIES OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN THROUGH THE REVISED INTERNATIONAL HEALTH

3 (2002) ("The IHR wholly depend on the affected country to make an official
notification to WHO once cases are diagnosed.").
52. See, e.g., WHO CONST., supranote 43, art. 71 ("The Organization may, on matters within its
competence, make suitable arrangements for consultation and co-operation with non-governmental
international organizations and, with the consent of the Government concerned, with national
organizations, governmental or non-governmental."); WHO, PrinciplesGoverning Relations Between
REGULATIONS

the WHO and Nongovernmental Organizations, in WHO, BASIC DOCUMENTS 74-79 (40th ed., 1994)
(detailing specific criteria to be met and procedures to be followed for the WHO to establish official
relations with an NGO).
53. See, e.g., PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (Michael R. Reich ed.,
2002) (discussing "ethical and organizational" issues in the rising trend of partnerships between public
and private organizations created to effectively address growing global health concerns).
54. WHO, GLOBAL DEFENSE, supra note 38, at 22.
55. Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, NGOs and Civil Society, at

http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/partners/ngo/default.asp (last visited July 24, 2004). See also KELLEY
LEE, GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH: AN INTRODUCTION 202 (2003) (citing the Global Fund as an

important example of global health governance). For more detailed analysis on the Global Fund as an
example of global health governance, see FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION
OF DISEASE, supra note 1, at 55-57.
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relations" with the WHO.
The WHO pursued the potential of global governance to improve infectious
disease control in revising the moribund IHR. Beginning in 1995, the WHO
proposed expanding the surveillance information it could collect to include
epidemiological data from non-governmental sources. 56 Under this proposal,
non-state actors would be direct participants in the global governance on
infectious diseases. Technological developments, such as the internet and e-mail,
made it possible for the WHO to cast its surveillance net much wider than
government ministries.
The power of global governance in the context of infectious disease control
was apparent before SARS in the establishment of the WHO's Global Outbreak
Alert and Response Network ("Global Network"). As I analyzed in detail
elsewhere, the global management of SARS reinforced the need for, and
benefits of, global governance in connection with infectious disease
surveillance. 57 The same lesson has been learned in the avian influenza
outbreak, where non-state actors provided information to international
58
organizations.
The importance of global governance in the SARS outbreak extends
beyond infectious disease surveillance because the containment of this outbreak
relied upon the participation of non-state actors in scientific research on the
causative agent of SARS, the formulation of clinical treatment protocols, and
efforts to develop diagnostic and vaccine technologies. 59 Non-state actors were
comprehensively engaged in the global governance of SARS. The response to
avian influenza likewise has involved non-state actors in the efforts to improve
surveillance, provide support for affected governments and international
organizations, increase laboratory capacity, and counsel on hospital infection
control. 60
The participation of non-state actors in the responses to the SARS and
avian influenza outbreaks differs from the vision of global governance emanating
from the WHO Constitution's Preamble and WHO policy in the post-World War
II period. The Health for All model of global governance conceives of

56. The International Response to Epidemics and Applications of the International Health
Regulations: Report of a WHO Informal Consultation 14-15, WHO Doc. WHO/EMC/IHR/96.1 (Dec.

11-14, 1995).
57. FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra note 1, at 11425, 132-36.
58. See, e.g., WHO, HSNI Avian Influenza: A Chronology of Key Events, COMMUNICABLE
DISEASE SURVEILLANCE & RESPONSE, [hereinafter WHO, H5N1] (noting media reports to WHO's

office in Hanoi about possible poultry morbidity and mortality in southern Viet Nam), at
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avianinfluenza/chronology/en/ (Feb. 12, 2004).
59. FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra note 1, at 14648 (discussing global production of surveillance data, clinical treatment guidelines, basic scientific
information about the causative agent of SARS, and diagnostic and vaccines technologies).
60. WHO, HSN1, supra note 58 (reporting on WHO's urgent request to its governmental and
non-governmental partners in the Global Network for help in many different areas connected with
bringing avian influenza under control).
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individuals and populations as legitimate claimants against state actors, largely
influenced by the concept of the right to health. Although this conception of
global governance creates space for non-state actors, particularly NGOs, to
influence policy, the state remains in the governance-driving seat. This
placement makes sense if the engine of global governance is the individual's
right to make claims against his or her government concerning health.
The participation of non-state actors in the global governance of SARS and
avian influenza has been more immediate and direct. As China discovered
during SARS, the WHO's access to non-governmental information destroyed
the Chinese government's ability to maintain control of SARS information and
the direction of its policy response. 6' The governments of Thailand and
report their
Indonesia similarly suffered embarrassment when their failures to
62
avian influenza outbreaks were revealed rapidly and transparently.
Together, the WHO and non-state actors now have the upper hand on
sovereign states, which no longer retain the initiative in infectious disease
Further, in connection with surveillance
Surveillance and response. 63
information, scientific research, clinical treatment protocols, and development of
diagnostics and vaccines, non-state actors participated side-by-side with state
actors in these governance activities, not as supplicants to governments for
recognition of rights-based claims on scarce resources.
The SARS outbreak revealed another feature of the new global governance
framework not present in the earlier post-Westphalian model. Under Health for
All, the WHO acted as an intermediary between the rights of individuals and the
duties of governments. Where effective health technologies were available (e.g.,
smallpox vaccine), the WHO contributed to the progressive realization of the
right to health without challenging state sovereignty. Beyond those restricted
contexts, the WHO's ability to influence and change state behavior was limited
61. See FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra note 1, at
116 ("China's refusal to provide SARS outbreak information to WHO in a timely, transparent,
complete, and verifiable manner ran headlong into the global health governance mechanism of formal
integration of non-governmental information into global infectious disease surveillance. Information
provided by non-state actors provided the catalyst for WHO and other countries to intensify pressure
on the Chinese government, forcing it to retreat repeatedly until the charade could not longer be
sustained in any form."). For more analysis on China's experience with SARS, see id. at 106-31; and,
in this symposium issue, Ruotao Wang, China's Response to SARS, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 147 (2004) and
Jacques deLisle, Atypical Pneumonia and Ambivalent Law and Politics:SARS and the Response to
SARS in China, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 191 (2004).

62. See Shawn W. Crispin, Margot Cohen, & Timothy Mapes, Spreading Disease: Bird-Flu
Outbreak Revives Concerns Stirred by SARS, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2004, at Al (reporting on
accusations that Thailand and Indonesia covered up their avian influenza outbreaks); Shawn W.
Crispin & James Hookway, Indonesia Balks at Culling, As Asian Governments Try to Coordinate
Response, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2004, at A16 (reporting on -allegations that the Thai and Indonesia
governments had tried to cover-up their avian influenza outbreaks).
63. This new reality for states was reflected in how the avian influenza outbreak unfolded. See
Alan Sipress, Thailand Concedes Missteps on Bird Flu; Prime Minister Urges Transparency,
Cooperation Following Denials of Outbreak, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2004, at A24 (noting that
Thailand's admission of mistakes "reflected an emerging consensus among Asian countries that they
must act openly and in close cooperation to avoid the outbreak of a devastating human epidemic").
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because states protected their sovereignty from disaggregation.
The SARS outbreak witnessed the WHO playing a governance role
unthinkable under either Westphalianism or Health for All. The comprehensive
involvement of non-state actors in the various aspects of the SARS effort
heightened the WHO's governance power because only it was in a position to
coordinate such a global endeavor. No single sovereign state, not even the
United States, could have managed the global governance of SARS as WHO
did.
The same dynamic unfolded in the avian influenza crisis because the WHO,
in partnership with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
65
Nations ("FAO") 64 and the World Organization for Animal Health ("OIE"),
66
spearheaded the global response to the 2004 bird flu outbreak.
These
organizations set the response agenda and forcefully acted to ensure that
governments and non-governmental actors follow the strategies outlined. For
example, when Indonesia balked at instituting wide-spread culling of poultry
flocks to contain its avian influenza outbreak, WHO officials quickly criticized
the Indonesian government publicly. 67 Indonesia reversed its policy the next
68
day.
During SARS, the WHO's governance significance went beyond the
functional necessity for WHO to coordinate the various actors involved in
containment. The WHO also took governance actions unprecedented not only
for the WHO, but also for international organizations generally. Without any
express legal or policy authority, the WHO issued travel alerts and
recommendations that caused affected countries serious political and economic
damage. 69 The global governance model that emerged during SARS accorded
the WHO independent power vis-A-vis its member states, an astonishing
development that indicates the extent to which Westphalian governance has
70
been abandoned.

64. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, at http://www.fao.org (last visited
July 24,2004).

65. World Organization for Animal Health, at http://www.oie.int (last visited July 24, 2004).
66. See, e.g., Press Release, WHO, Unprecedented Spread of Avian Influenza Requires Broad
Collaboration-FAO/OIE/WHO Call for International Assistance, at http://www.who.int/mediacentre
/releases/2004/pr7/en/ (Jan. 27, 2004) (noting that the spread of avian influenza "in Asia is a threat to
human health").
67. Crispin & Hookway, supranote 62, at A16.
68. Timothy Mapes & Charles Hutzler, Mixed Responses to Bird Flu Worry Health Officials,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 30,2004, at A10.

69. WHO issued no travel alerts or advisories with respect to countries affected by avian
influenza because the H5N1 virus did not establish efficient human-to-human transmission that would
make travel to these countries dangerous.
See WHO, Advice to International Travellers,
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE SURVEILLANCE & RESPONSE, at http://www.who.intlcsr/diseaselavian_
influenza/travel_200402_11/en/ (Feb. 11, 2004).
70. Although not exercising independent power as WHO did in SARS, the international
organizations spearheading the global containment of avian influenza proposed that FAO, OILE, and
WHO have joint decision making authority with affected governments as part of a regional
coordination group for managing the crisis. See Recommendations of the Joint FAO/OlE Emergency
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After SARS and avian influenza, the governance power possessed by nonstate actors and the WHO reallocates sovereignty over public health, especially
with respect to epidemiological surveillance. Excluding China, the level of
reporting and cooperation exhibited by states affected by SARS was
unprecedented in the context of a serious epidemic. The solidarity among nonstate actors, governments, and the WHO in governing this outbreak was, from a
Moreover, this cooperative global
historical perspective, astonishing.
governance took place without any international legal framework in place
mandating compliance-another indicator of Westphalianism's demise.
The same lesson emerges from the avian influenza outbreak. As the Thai
and Indonesian governments discovered, efforts to hide serious infectious
disease outbreaks are futile in today's technological environment and
counterproductive from political, public health, and economic perspectives. In
terms of human cases of avian influenza infection, countries have reported them
71
to the WHO despite having no international legal obligation to so report.
More difficulties have been experienced in the reporting of avian influenza
outbreaks in poultry flocks; but the WHO, FAO, and OIE jointly emphasized
the need for solidarity on transparent reporting of animal diseases of potential
72
public health concern.
Global health governance constitutes a vertical disaggregation of
sovereignty in international relations more powerful than the one envisaged in
Health for All. The behavior of states with respect to SARS and avian influenza
suggests that governments are learning, sometimes in painfully unnecessary
ways, that Westphalian governance is dead. The disaggregation of public health
sovereignty witnessed in the SARS and avian influenza outbreaks has not,
however, been driven by concepts of human rights, transnational solidarity, and
Raw self-interest led to state acquiescence of the
universal justice.
disaggregation of public health sovereignty because globalized disease threats,
and the need for effectively coordinated global governance of such threats,
transforms the context in which states exercise such sovereignty.
2. Global Public Goods for Health
The second feature that distinguishes the post-Cold War "new thinking" on

Regional Meeting on Avian Influenza Control in Animals in Asia, Bangkok, Thailand, Feb. 26-28,

2004-Extract from the Final Report [hereinafter Recommendations of the Joint FAO/O1E], at 3 ("A
regional coordination group should be formed by FAO, OIE, WHO and the central governments of
the countries in the region to allow joint decision making ....) (emphasis added), at
http://www.fao.or.th/04-02-26.htm (last visited July 24, 2004).
71. WHO, H5NI, supra note 58 (reporting on notifications to WHO of avian influenza from
various affected countries).
72. At an emergency meeting on avian influenza in Bangkok, Thailand at the end of February
2004, the WHO, FAO, and OIE asserted that "[m]ore frequent updates of the disease situation in
animals is necessary to allow preventive measures in neighboring countries and to facilitate emergency
preparedness for any necessary animal and public health interventions. Reporting of significant
animal disease events should be independent of commercial and political considerations."
Recommendations of the Joint FAO/OIE,supra note 70, at 1.
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global health from Westphalian and Health for All models concerns the
production of global public goods for health ("GPGH"). 73 "Public goods" are
goods or services the consumption of which, is non-excludable and nonrivalrous. 74 "Global public goods" exhibit non-excludability and non-rivalry in
consumption across national boundaries and traditional regional groupings. 75
GPGH are health-related public goods or services the benefits of which are
globally accessible. 76 Containment and prevention of globally dangerous
infectious diseases and the production of health-related information, such as
77
global surveillance data on infectious diseases, are both considered GPGH.
Under Westphalianism, the regime for infectious disease control sought to
reduce trade and travel problems caused by cross-border microbial traffic. The
objective was tailored to the national interests of the great powers, which feared
pathogen importation from poor, developing countries and wanted to mitigate
the impact of quarantine practices on their export trade. The GPGH concept
departs from the narrow, state-centric objectives of Westphalianism in two ways.
First, GPGH envisage policy results that reach beyond the state and its national
interests vis-A-vis other states. The ambition is to produce public goods that are
globally accessible by governments and non-state actors. Thus, GPGH
encompass more than state interactions and are sought for reasons beyond
defending against exogenous threats and promoting national exports. Finally,
GPGH promise to benefit not only the great powers, but also people in
developing countries.
Second, GPGH deviate from the traditional Westphalian approach in how
the goods are produced. In Westphalian public health, states produced regimes
that applied strictly to governmental behavior. GPGH differ because they seek
participation from not only governments and international organizations but also
non-state actors.
Public-private partnerships best illustrate the process
innovation in the GPGH concept, and this innovation connects to the
development of global governance mechanisms.
GPGH also differ from the post-Westphalianism of Health for All.
Although the WHO Constitution's Preamble has principles that echo the

73. See generally

GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS FOR HEALTH: HEALTH ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC

HEALTH PERSPECTIVES (Richard D. Smith et al. eds., 2003) (discussing the concept of global public

goods for health).
74. See Inge Kaul et al., Defining Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2, 3 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999) (defining

public goods by examining their opposite in private goods); David Woodward & Richard D. Smith,
Global Public Goods and Health: Concepts and Issues, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS FOR HEALTH:
HEALTH ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 3, 4-5 (Richard D. Smith et al. eds., 2003)

(describing public goods as the opposite of private goods).
75. See Kaul et al., supra note 74, at 10 (discussing and defining the global public); Woodward &
Smith, supra note 74, at 8 (describing the under-supply of public goods in a free market).
76. See Woodward & Smith, supra note 74, at 10-15 (discussing global public health as a public
good).

77. Id. at 10-12, 14.
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substance of GPGH, 78 the "public goods" framework arises from economics
rather than rights-based discourse, and thus is not in harmony with the core tenet
of Health for All. In economic theory, a public good is an economic good that
will not be produced without public intervention because the incentives or
resources for private actors are insufficient. 79 The need for public goods arises,
thus, from "market failures." Advocacy for interventions to produce public
goods neither require nor reject a rights-based foundation. GPGH can be
supported on both utilitarian and deontological grounds, providing opportunity
for different conceptual perspectives to converge on a common policy.
As I explored elsewhere, the global management of SARS revealed the
power of producing GPGH. 80 The production of epidemiological surveillance,
scientific research on the causative agent of SARS, protocols on clinical
treatment of SARS patients, and data for diagnostics and vaccines all represent
GPGH. 81 Similar efforts to produce GPGH have emerged in the global fight
82
clinical
against avian influenza, including surveillance information,
83
management on humans infected with the H5N1 virus, scientific research on
the highly pathogenic strain of H5N1 circulating in Asia, 84 vaccine development
87
86
efforts, 85 advice on proper poultry flock destruction, and.food safety issues.
GPGH production also reflects a disaggregation of sovereignty as
understood in Westphalian governance. Westphalianism focused on narrow
state interests, largely trade expansion through removal of trade-restricting
health measures. GPGH do not destroy the concept of the "national interest,"

78. See, e.g., WHO CONST., supra note 43, at pmbl. ("Unequal development in different
countries in the promotion of health and control of disease, especially communicable disease, is a
common danger.").
79. See Kaul et al., supra note 74, at 2-9, for basic definitions of pure public good, impure public
good, externalities that affect the good, and the role of public intervention.
80. FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra note 1, at 5760, 65-67, 126-29, 145-48.
81. Id. at 145-48.
82. WHO, WHO Guidelines for Global Surveillance of Influenza A/H5, COMMUNICABLE
DISEASE SURVEILLANCE & RESPONSE, at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/guidelines/

globalsurveillance/en/ (last visited July 7, 2004).
83. WHO, WHO Interim Guidelines on Clinical Management of Humans Infected with Influenza
A (H5N1), COMMUNICABLE DISEASE SURVEILLANCE & RESPONSE, at http://www.who.intlcsr/disease/

avianinfluenza/guidelines/clinicalmanage/en (Mar. 2,2004).
84. See, e.g., WHO, Control of Avian Influenza A (H5N]): Public Health Concerns,
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE SURVEILLANCE & RESPONSE, at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-

influenza/guidelines/ publichealth/en/ (Feb. 10, 2004) (noting need to conduct research "for better
preparedness and response").
85. See, e.g., id. (setting as a strategic goal "the immediate development of a new vaccine for
humans against H5N1").
86. WHO, WHO Interim Recommendations for the Protection of Persons Involved in the Mass
Slaughter of Animals Potentially Infected with Highly PathogenicInfluenza Viruses, COMMUNICABLE
DISEASE SURVEILLANCE & RESPONSE, at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/guidelines/

interimrecommendations/en/ (Jan. 26, 2004).
87. WHO, Avian Influenza: Food Safety Issues (Jan. 24, 2004 & Feb. 12, 2004), available at

http://www.who.int/foodsafety/micro/avian/en/.
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but broaden that concept such that the state's interests in global health are
defined expansively rather than narrowly. The enlargement of the national
interest's scope reflects the realization of the globalized nature of public health
threats and the reality that such threats can only be managed through concepts
of the national interest and governance that transcend Westphalian assumptions
and attitudes. National interests become interdependent horizontally among
states and integrated vertically through participation of non-state actors and the
leadership of international organizations in governance endeavors.
D. The "New Way of Working"
During the SARS outbreak, David L. Heymann, WHO's Executive
Director for Communicable Diseases, argued that the world was witnessing a
"new way of working" on infectious disease threats in the twenty-first century. 88
WHO's Michael Ryan similarly argued that, during SARS, global public health
crossed a governance Rubicon, meaning that "[t]here's no going back now. ' 89
The governance responses orchestrated by WHO concerning avian influenza in
2004 underscore that a new template has superceded the Westphalian and the
Health for All models. The "new way of working" is important in its own right,
but next I analyze how these developments, along with others, combine to
suggest that an even deeper and perhaps more profound governance change is
underway.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL OUTLINES IN GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE
Having traced transformations in public health governance in the United
States and international relations, I highlight in this part similarities between
these phenomena in order to demonstrate that their parallels hint at the
emergence of "constitutional outlines" for global health governance. These
outlines are evidence that a new context for public health governance is taking
shape globally, however nascent and precarious the shaping process remains.
A. Parallelsbetween the Federalizationand Globalization of Public Health
Governance
The federalization and globalization of public health governance share
characteristics in causes and effects. In both, unprecedented changes in the
nature, volume, and speed of threats to population health, especially from
infectious diseases, have caused the de facto vertical reallocation of governance
power. This reallocation of power reflects the inadequacy of traditional
governance frameworks.
In the United States, the vertical allocation of public health sovereignty to
88. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Threat (SARS): Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor, and Pension, 108th Cong. 17 (2003) (testimony of David L. Heymann, Executive
Director of Communicable Diseases, WHO).
89. Charles Piller, In SARS Aftermath, WHO's in Charge, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at Al
(quoting Michael Ryan).
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the states of the Union no longer provides a sufficient foundation for tackling
globalized health threats, such as bioterrorism or naturally occurring infectious
disease outbreaks spread through globalization. In international relations, the
horizontal allocation of public health sovereignty to states likewise is ill-suited to
handle globalized health threats in the twenty-first century. The legal allocations
of public health sovereignty in the traditional constitutional and international
governance frameworks have not been formally overturned, but threats have
sufficiently developed to trigger shifts in how such threats are governed within
the United States and in the international system.
The federalization and globalization shifts underscore the unprecedented
rise of public health as an issue of national and global governance. 90 Traditional
constitutional and international governance shared the characteristic that public
health was not a prominent political, economic, or social issue. Laurie Garrett
observed that "[p]ublic health in the wealthy world... struggled to maintain
respect, funding, and self-definition in the late twentieth century." 9' She noted
that "[i]n the United States, 'public health' had become-incorrectlysynonymous with medicine for poor people. Few Americans at the millennium
Rather,
thought of 'public health' as a system that functioned in their interests.
92
people."
impoverished
for
handout
government
a
as
viewed
it was
Public health in international relations shared the same fate. Even when
Westphalian governance prevailed, public health was never an issue of "high
politics" in international relations. 93 After WHO's establishment, "international
health" became associated with improving health in poor countries. This
situation reflects the transition from Westphalian to post-Westphalian
governance policies at WHO and elsewhere. For developed countries, postWestphalian health activities after World War II, such as those undertaken by
WHO, became humanitarian matters not directly connected to their core
national interests. For "most of the post-1945 period,. . . the internationalization
of public health has held marginal interest for developed countries that view it
merely as a means for developing states to transition toward improved public
health." 94 Post-Westphalian efforts were, to paraphrase Garrett, viewed in
90. On the rise of public health as a global political issue, see David P. Fidler, Germs, Norms, and
Power: Global Health's PoliticalRevolution, J. L. SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. (June 4, 2004), available
at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/issuei2004-1/fidler.html.
91. LAURIE GARRETr, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: THE COLLAPSE OF GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 11

(2000).
92. Id. at 8.
93. For example, public health has not attracted much attention from scholars working in the
See Ilona Kickbusch, Global Health Governance: Some
discipline of international relations.
Theoretical Considerations on the New Political Space, in HEALTH IMPACTS OF GLOBALIZATION:
TOWARDS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 192 (Kelly Lee ed., 2003) (noting "the gulf that divides scholars of

policy/International Relations and public health"); Kelley Lee & Anthony Zwi, A Global Political
Economy Approach to AIDS: Ideology, Interests, and Implications, in HEALTH IMPACTS OF
GLOBALIZATION, supra, at 13 (noting that "little attention has been devoted to health in the
I[nternational] R[elations] field").

94. David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health. Emerging Infectious Diseases and
InternationalRelations, 5 INT'L J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 29 (1997).
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developed nations as governmental and intergovernmental handouts to poor
people.
The federalization and globalization of public health governance reveal how
dramatically public health has risen as a political, economic, and social concern
in the early twenty-first century. The rise of public health has led to the
transformations captured by analysis of the federalization and globalization of
public health governance. Both processes demonstrate that the traditional loci
of governance authority are no longer adequate, creating the need for vertically
reallocating power in a manner that provides a better foundation for controlling
globalized health threats.
Despite these parallels, federalization and globalization of public health
governance differ in one respect.
Reallocation of power in the U.S.
constitutional system draws on the Constitution's vertical allocation of specific
functions (e.g., national security, interstate and foreign commerce) to the federal
government. Thus; the Constitution provides a clear legal framework into which
governance of globalized public health threats can be rearranged. No such
preexisting vertical allocation exists in international law to accommodate the
transformations triggered by the globalization of public health governance.
Thus, vertical reallocation of power in the globalization of public health
functions through "networked anarchy," in which the multiplicity of state and
non-state actors clash and cooperate to produce global health governance. 95
This distinction between federalization and globalization is a reminder that
the political contexts of constitutional and global governance are radically
different. The nonexistence of a preexisting framework for the vertical
reallocation of public health governance power in international relations merely
reflects that governance in this context unfolds in political anarchy. Because
constitutional governance is about. political hierarchy, the constitutional
framework has a template for handling new challenges. Unitary governance
hierarchies are unlikely to be achieved in international relations.
Within the decentralized environment of anarchical governance, the
emergence of "constitutional" functions in global health governance can be,
however, detected. These functions mirror the evolution of public health
governance functions by the U.S. federal government in the federalization
process. The resonance between the development of these functions in the
federalization and globalization of public health governance suggests a nascent
constitutionalization of public health as a governance concern in global politics.

95.. WHO's Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network is a good example of global health
governance by "networked anarchy." See WHO, Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network,
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE SURVEILLANCE & RESPONSE ("The Global Outbreak Alert and Response

Network is a technical collaboration of existing institutions and networks who pool human and
technical resources for the rapid identification, confirmation and response to outbreaks of
international importance. The Network provides an operational framework to link this expertise and
skill to keep the international community constantly alert to the threat of outbreaks and ready to
respond."), at http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2004).
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B. "Constitutional"Functionsfor Global Health Governance
Part II traced four federal governance functions that have grown more
important in addressing public health concerns: (1) provision of national
security; (2) the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce; (3) support for
public health preparedness and response; and (4) protection of individual rights.
The globalization of public health governance reveals the emergence of
equivalent functions for global governance, which this section analyzes.
1. Public Health and Global Security
Section II.A examined how characterizing public health threats as national
security problems contributed to the federalization of public health governance
in the United States. At the global level, the parallel development involves the
characterization of public health crises as threats to global security. This
characterization has produced unprecedented public health governance
responsibilities for international organizations, in a manner similar to the new
constitutional functions the federal government shoulders through the linkage
betweeri national security and public health.
WHO policy recognizes the emergence of a global security function in its
work by building strategies to achieve "global health security." 96 This concept
encompasses security against direct threats to public health, including those
created by bioterrorism and naturally occurring infectious diseases. One reform
the WHO has proposed for the revision of the IHR-shifting from diseasespecific notification to notification of "public health emergencies of international
concern"-captures features of the "global health security" concept. As WHO
has explained, its proposal would require WHO member states "to notify all
events potentially constituting a public health emergency of international
concern.., occurring in their territory, irrespective of cause, including those
associated with the accidental, natural, or suspected intentional release of
97
pathogens, chemical or radionuclear materials."

96. See, e.g., WHO, Global Health Security: Epidemic Alert and Response, World Health

Assembly Resolution WHA54.14 (May 21, 2001) (commenting on development of plans for responses
to international public health emergencies); Global Health Security, 76 WKLY. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL
REC. 166 (June 1, 2001) (on various resolutions adopted to address new and re-emerging infectious
diseases); WHO, GLOBAL DEFENSE, supra note 38, at 14-19 (on global health security).
97. WHO Intergovernmental Working Group on the Revision of the International Health
Regulations,

International Health Regulations:

Working

paper for

regional consultations,

IGWG/IHR/Working Paper/12.2003, Jan. 12, 2004, Foreword, at 2-3 [hereinafter IHR Revision Draft].
In addition, the IHR Revision Draft defines "disease" to mean "an illness that presents a risk of
significant harm to humans caused by biological, chemical or radio-nuclear sources." IHR Revision
Draft, supra, art. 1, at 5. For analysis and comments on the IHR Revision Draft, see David P. Fidler,
Revision of the WHO's InternationalHealth Regulations, AM. Soc. INT'L. L. INSIGHTS (April 2004),
available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh132.htm; Initial U.S. Government comments on the first
draft of the proposed revision of the International Health Regulations ("IHR"s) (Mar. 5, 2004),
available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/revisionprocess/comments/en; Center for the Law and the
Public's Health, The Draft Revised International Health Regulations (Mar. 3, 2004), available at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Reader/chl2/chl2.htm; David P. Fidler, Comments on WHO's Interim
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This proposal includes traditional WHO concern with naturally occurring
infectious diseases but is more expansive because it also covers: (1) more than a
limited number of infectious diseases; and (2) public health threats involving (a)
the intentional use of pathogens, and (b) the accidental or intentional release of
chemicals and radio-nuclear materials. 98 The influence of national and global
security concerns with weapons of mass destruction is evident in WHO's
thinking about revising the IHR.
National security concerns about bioterrorism and naturally occurring
infectious diseases reinforce the emergence of a security function in global health
governance because the foreign policies of concerned governments, such as the
United States, include recognition of the need for international cooperation and
global support for national security efforts. The United States has stressed, for
example, the importance of the WHO's surveillance capabilities as part of a
strategy to address the bioterrorism threat. 99 The United States joined with
other members of the G-7 and Mexico in the Global Health Security Initiative,
which focuses on both intentional and naturally occurring infectious disease
100
threats.
Global health security also involves addressing security threats posed by
infectious diseases contributing to state failure and instability in developing
countries. In an unprecedented move, the United Nations Security Council in
2000 addressed the HIV/AIDS pandemic as a threat to international peace and
security. 101 Major global health efforts, including the Global Fund 1° 2 and
WHO's "3 by 5" Initiative, 10 3 seek to bring more resources to bear on major
infectious disease crises to help mitigate their impact on regional instability, state
capacities, and individual health.
These and other developments in global health policy indicate that global
health security represents a critical function for global governance in the twenty-

Draft of the Revised International Health Regulations (Mar. 9, 2004) (on file with author).
98. WHO, Preparednessfor DeliberateEpidemics, COMMUNICABLE DISEASE SURVEILLANCE &

RESPONSE (discussing WHO's strategy for preparing for and responding to public health threats
caused by the use of biological weapons), at http://www.who.int/csr/delibepidemics/en/ (last visited
Aug. 20,2004).
99. Press Release, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Joins Ottawa Plan to Fight Bioterrorism: Calls
for international cooperation to protect public health (Nov. 8, 2001) (noting U.S. backing for greater
"support [of] the WHO disease surveillance network and WHO's efforts to develop a coordinated
strategy for disease outbreak containment"), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/
01110807.htm.
100. Overview: Global Health Security Initiative (GHS) (Nov. 26, 2003) (on file with author).
101. The UN Security Council met on January 10, 2000 to discuss The Impact of AIDS on Peace
and Security in Africa. Round-Up: Developments throughoutAfrica, Renewed Violence in Middle East

Among Key Issues for Security Council in 2000, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. SC/6987 (2000), availableat
http://www.un.org/newslpress/docs/2001/sc6987.doc.htm.
102. See Global Fund Home Page, at http://www.theglobalfund.org/en (last visited July 15, 2004)
(describing organization's goals and methods to address global health issues).
103. See WHO, The "3 by 5" Initiative (describing organization's goal to provide access to
antiretroviral treatment to three million people living with HIV/AIDS in developing countries by
2005), at http://www.who.int/3by5/en/ (last visited July 7, 2004).
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first century. Severe security threats in the public health context require both
the federalization and the globalization of public health governance because the
nature of these problems transcends the ability of the states of the Union and
individual sovereign states to manage. In international relations, the governance
function of providing global health security must be fulfilled by networks of
actors, state and non-state, because of. the absence of centralized system of
government.
Nevertheless, this function's emergence in global health
governance parallels the emergence of the equivalent function in constitutional
governance in the United States, providing evidence of the interdependence of
the federalization and globalization phenomena.
2. Public Health and the "Global Commerce Clause"
As Section II.B described, the Commerce Clause in the U.S. Constitution
has long given the federal government the function of calibrating state protection
of health with the flow of interstate and foreign commerce. The existence of the
Commerce Clause means that the constitutional power of the states of Union to
regulate for health purposes is embedded in a constitutional system in which free
flows of commerce is a structural principle. The Commerce Clause also
empowers the federal government to legislate to address health threats arising
through interstate and foreign commerce, a power increasingly important as the
speed, scale, and volume of both kinds of trade have increased.
As Westphalian governance indicates, public health and international trade
have a long history during which states (mainly the great powers) tried to
balance the state's sovereign right to protect the health of its people with
maintaining or increasing levels of international trade. This balancing function,
accomplished originally through international sanitation treaties and continued
in the IHR, faded from international health in the post-World War II period as
policy focused on other issues.
The trade-health linkage continued after World War II in international
trade law, including in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATr");1°4 but the linkage was problematical because: (1) the ideological
conflict between communism and capitalism limited the global reach of this body
of law; (2) problems with the manner in which the linkage operated in
international trade law (e.g., abuse of "health" as a reason to restrict trade in the
GATT); 10 5 and (3) GATT's application to trade in goods only.
The establishment of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in 1995 has
stimulated, however, the emergence of a "global commerce clause" in global
health governance. Rules and agreements within WTO law have created a

104. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188,
art. XX(b) [hereinafter GATT], reprinted in WTO, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 423 (1999) [hereinafter WTO LEGAL TExTS] (providing a

general exception to GATT obligations for measures necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life
or health).
105. See FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECrIOUs DISEASES, supra note 36, at 126-33 for

a discussion of problems experienced with GATT Article XX(b).
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dynamic similar to the one the Commerce Clause produces in U.S. constitutional
governance. First, international trade law under the WTO means that the power
of WTO member states to exercise their sovereignty for public health purposes is
not absolute but is embedded in a governance system in which liberalized trade
is a structural principle. Just as the federal courts will scrutinize health measures
of states for compliance with the Commerce Clause, the WTO's Dispute
between WTO
Settlement Body has compulsory jurisdiction to decide disputes
06
member states concerning trade-restricting health measures
Second, WTO agreements and rules represent "legislation" that balances
the objective of trade liberalization and the public health sovereignty of WTO
member states across not only trade in goods'0 7 but also trade in services 08 and
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. 10 9 Like the federal
government, sovereign states adopted rules regulating the impact of traderestricting health measures on global commerce.
In addition, controversies concerning WTO's rules have led to global
governance instruments clarifying the balance between trade and health, most
notably the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health" l0
and the Agreement on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha

106. WTO's Dispute Settlement Body has decided a number of cases involving trade-restricting
measures ostensibly designed to protect human health. See, e.g., United States--Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, at 2,
29 (April 29, 1996) (deciding on the implementation of the Clean Air Act of 1990 by the "Gasoline
Rule," which was designed "to control toxic and other pollution caused by the combustion of gasoline
manufactured in or imported into the United States."); European Communities-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Appellate Body Report, WTO Docs.
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/ABIR, at 98-100 (Jan. 16, 1998) (ruling on a dispute between the
European Communities and the United States and Canada on the interpretation of the Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures to certain hormones used on imported meat
Canada-Patent
http://www.worldtradelaw.netlreports/wtoab/ec-hormones(ab).pdf;
products),
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R, at 7-8, 174 (Mar. 17,
2000) (resolving a dispute between the European Communities and Canada on whether Canada's
patent laws violated the TRIPS agreement), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/7428d.pdf;
European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Appellate
Body Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R, at 70-71 (Mar. 12, 2001) (finding against Canada's claim
that the EC Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products violated GATT or The
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and ruling that the EC Measure was "necessary to protect
human...life or health"), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/ec-asbestos(ab).pdf.
107. GATT, supra note 104, at 424 (stating that the original GAIT was aimed at tariffs and trade
on goods).
108. General Agreement on Trade in Services, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, reprinted in WTO LEGAL TEXTS, supra note
104, at 284, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
109. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, reprinted in WTO
LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 104, at 321, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
110. Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO, 4th Sess.,
VTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 14, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/ministe/min0le/mindecl-trips-e.htm.
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Similarly, global
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.'
treaty,
produced
an
unprecedented
governance efforts, coordinated by WHO,
112
to
address
negative
health
on
Tobacco
Control,
the Framework Convention
externalities produced by the globalization of trade in tobacco and tobacco
products.113
The emergence of a "global commerce clause" in global health governance
is a nightmare for many WTO critics because they perceive that this
development compromises the ability of a sovereign state to protect the health of
its citizens. 114 Analyzing these fears is beyond this article's scope, but arguing
that global health governance contains a function involving the balancing of
trade and health is neither pro-health nor pro-trade.
Constitutional (e.g., United States) and quasi-constitutional (e.g., European
Community) governance systems regulate the impact of health measures on the
flow of trade within their jurisdictions. 115 In these systems, the necessity ofthe
balancing process is not controversial because the participating units share the
conviction that health protection is interdependent with other political and
economic objectives. The intensification of trade and investment stimulated by

globalization accentuates

the importance of having governance systems

The
equipped to calibrate the demands of trade and public health."t 6
globalization of public health governance thus creates the "global commerce
clause" function for global health governance.
The controversial operation of the "global commerce clause" has raised the
political and governance profile of public health in international and national
politics. The controversies and battles fought over the meaning of WTO

agreements have brought public health unprecedented international political and
legal attention. In addition, some experts believe that global health governance
has been productive in striking acceptable balances between public health
sovereignty and liberalized trade in important areas of the WTO, including the

111. WTO, Agreement on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doc. WTIL/540 (Aug. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/englis/ tratope/tripse/implem..para6_e.htm.
112. WHO, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, at http://www.who.int/tobacco/
areas/framework/en/ (last visited July 7,2004).
113. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 146, 149 (2002)
(noting that WHO moved to "regulate tobacco at least in part because another, the WTO, has been.
altogether too successful in reducing barriers to the tobacco trade and has ignored the resulting
negative externalities.").
114. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Warning: The WTO can be hazardous to public health, excerpts
from Lori Wallach & Patrick Woodall, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION? THE COMPREHENSIVE

GUIDE TO THE WTO (analyzing WTO cases that bring about new constraints on public health goals
and policies on grounds of interference with trade), at http://www.citizen.org/print_article.cfm?ID=10444 (last visited July 7, 2004).
115. See Slotboom, supra note 31, at 555-64 (outlining how the EC regulates health law, and
summarizing relevant cases).
116. The WTO and WHO jointly recognized the governance importance of balancing trade and
health in jointly publishing WTO Agreements & Public Healti A Joint Study by the WHO and The
WTO Secretariatin 2002.
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SPS Agreement, n 78 the TRIPS Agreement, and the General Agreement on
11
Trade in Services.
3. Public Health and Global Preparedness and Response
The federalization of public health governance in the United States
included the expansion of the federal government's function of supporting public
health preparedness and response.11 9 This expansion relates to public health's
emergence as a national security issue and the intensified responsibility of the
federal government's commerce function created by economic globalization.
The globalization of public health governance likewise expands the preparedness
and response function for global health governance.
International health organizations have historically supported national
120
governments' preparation for, and response to, public health problems.
Supporting public health preparedness and response in sovereign states is, thus, a
classical function of international health governance. In the 1990s and early
2000s, the need for international support for national-level public health
capabilities increased as public health systems around the world came under
heightened stress, particularly those in the developing world. Sovereign states
found themselves in a position analogous to individual states in the United States
requiring help in'confronting the globalization of public health.
Many examples can be cited of global health governance mechanisms
mobilizing support for national-level public health preparedness and response.
WHO has continued and intensified traditional disease eradication strategies,
such as the ongoing polio eradication effort. 121 Public-private partnerships have
formed to develop new drugs and vaccines for diseases neglected by private
industry and to increase access in developing countries to essential medicines,
such as antiretroviral therapies. 122 Perhaps the best-known public-private
partnership, the Global Fund, represents an unprecedented effort to redistribute
wealth from rich to poor in the name of infectious disease control. 123 Individual
117. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement"),
Dec. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
reprintedin WTO LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 104, at 59,33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
118. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche & Elizabeth R. Jungman, Health Policy and the WTO, 31 J. L.
MED. & ETHics 529, 530 (2003) (arguing "that portrayal of the WTO and its associated agreements as
implacable threats to the health of people constitutes pessimism bordering on panic. Not only does
this portrayal overlook potential synergies between trade and health: it all but ignores recent
developments within the WTO that have affirmed member states' power to promote health.").
119. See supra Parts II.
120. See, e.g., WHO CONST., supra note 43, art. 2(c) (stating that one of WHO's functions is "to
assist Governments, upon request, in strengthening health services").
121. See Global Polio Eradication Initiative, The Global Eradicationof Polio - A World without
Polio (recognizing The Global Polio Eradication Initiative as the largest public health initiative in the
world), at http://www.polioeradication.org (last visited July 7, 2004).
122. See WHO, GLOBAL DEFENSE, supra note 38, at 22-31 (discussing the "recent wave of
public-private partnerships" designed to "discover new drugs and vaccines for diseases neglected by
research and industry, and to vastly improve access by the poor to existing products").
123. Global Fund, How the Fund Works, (stating that "[tihe Global Fund's purpose is to attract,
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philanthropists, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 124 and powerful
countries, such as the United States, 125 are pumping unprecedented sums of
money into public health preparedness and response in the developing world.
The WHO's construction of the Global Network also constitutes a new
global health governance endeavor for preparedness and response. Through this
Network, the WHO is establishing a system that will more rapidly identify
threats to public health and more effectively bring national and global personnel
and resources to bear in order to prevent such threats from becoming epidemic
or endemic. Evidence collected by the WHO prior to SARS demonstrated that
the strategy was working, 126 and the successful containment of SARS and the
mobilization in response to avian influenza further illustrate the benefits of
WHO's leadership on public health preparedness and response.
Importantly, the WHO's global health security strategy implemented
through the Global Network supports public health preparedness and response
in all states, not just developing countries. As SARS and avian influenza show,
developed and developing countries confront the need to respond early and
rapidly to emerging health threats. A global surveillance and response system is
vital to such early and rapid response. Historically, the WHO's support for
preparedness and response has focused on developing countries. Its global
health security strategy, however, offers preparedness and response support on a
truly global basis. The preparedness and response function of global health
governance constitutes, thus, a GPGH.
WHO's proposed revision of the IHR also highlights the preparedness and
response function of global health governance. In addition to strengthening
WHO's position in global infectious disease surveillance and response activities,
the proposed IHR revision attempts to increase preparedness and response at
the national level. According to WHO, the proposed revision "provides States
with direction regarding the minimum core surveillance and response capacities
required at the national level in order to successfully implement the global
127
health security, epidemic alert and response strategy."'

manage and disburse resources to fight AIDS, TB and malaria"), at http://www.theglobalfund.org/
en/about/how/ (last visited July 20,2004). To date, approximately $5.4 billion has been pledged to the
Global Fund by governments, non-governmental organizations, corporations, and individuals. Global
Fund, Pledges & Contributions,at http://www.theglobalfund.org/ en/funds-raised/pledges/ (last visited
July 7, 2004).

124. See Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Infectious Diseases:Strivingfor Global Health Equity,
("The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has committed more than $1 billion to projects focused on the
prevention and control of infectious diseases."), at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/globalhealth/
infectiousdiseases/default.htm (last visited July 7, 2004).
125. See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: The President's Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (Jan. 29, 2003) (describing the Bush administration's $15 billion Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief), availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030129-1.html.
126. See WHO, GLOBAL DEFENSE, supra note 38, at 65 (arguing that the Global Network has
made an "immediate-and measurable--difference" to infectious disease surveillance and response).
127. IHR Revision Draft, supra note 97, Foreword, at 3. Further, Articles 4.1 and 10.1 of the
IHR Revision Draft require WHO member states to develop and maintain the capacity to detect,
report, and respond effectively to public health risks and events potentially constituting public health
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As with the national security and commerce functions, supporting public
health preparedness and response through global governance represents a more
decentralized and complex task than experienced in the federalization of public
health governance in the United States. Nevertheless, supporting public health
preparedness and response around the world has become more important and is
a governance function that can only be fulfilled by mechanisms of global health
governance.
4. Public Health and Global Scrutiny for Human Rights
The federalization of public health governance in the United States
involved heightened sensitivity to the protection of individual rights in contexts
of public health action by governments. 128 This sensitivity appeared in many
areas, including HIV/AIDS-related discrimination, t 29 treatment of persons
infected with drug-resistant pathogens, 130 and planning for public health
13
responses to bioterrorist attacks. '
An analogous human rights sensibility developed in global public health
during the last twenty years of the twentieth century, largely driven by the
human rights strategy adopted to combat HIV/AIDS. 132 Human rights as an
aspect of post-Westphalian governance began with the WHO Constitution, and
the emphasis in the 'post-World War II period was on the right to health, as
illustrated by the Health for All campaign. The right to health has' received
renewed attention in recent years, as evidenced by the United Nations' issuance
of General Comment No. 14 on the right to health 133 and appointment of a
emergencies of international concern. Id., arts. 4.1 and 10.1, at 7, 9.
128. See supraPart II.E.
129. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN & ZITA LAZZARINI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE
AIDS PANDEMIC 17-19, 52-54, 75-78 (1997) (discussing HIV/AIDS-related discrimination).
130. See David P. Fidler, Legal Issues Associated with Antimicrobial Drug Resistance, 4
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 169, 172 (1998) (raising problems antimicrobial resistance creates
for individual rights), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol4no2/adobe/fid.pdf (last visited
Sept. 8, 2004).
131. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Perspective, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Human Rights, 21
HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 94 (arguing that bioterrorism shows the need for a more global and
federalized public health system that will be more effective if constitutional rights are protected);
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of Terrorism: Rethinking Individual Rights and

Common Goods, 21 HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 79, 83-91 (comparing the effectiveness and
human rights protection of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act ("MSEPHA"), which was
created in response to the 2001 anthrax attacks); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Commentary: When Terrorism
Threatens Health: How FarAre Limitations on Human Rights Justified?, 31 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 524,

524-27 (2003) (analyzing the interplay between human rights and protection of public health); see
generally Annas, supra note 29, at 33-70 (outlining public health responses to September 11, 2001 and
anthrax).
132. Sofia .Gruskin & Daniel Tarantola, Health and Human Rights, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF
PUBLIC HEALTH 311 (Roger Detels et al. eds., 4th ed. 2002).
133. United Nations Human Rights Website, Economic and Social Council: Substantive Issues
Arising in the Implantation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
General Comment No. 14 (2000), at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/40d009901358

b0e2c1256915005090be (Nov. 8,2000).
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Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health. 134 NGOs have also concentrated
more attention on the right to health in the last decade, especially in connection
135
with campaigns to increase access to antiretrovirals in the developing world.
Concerns about, and criticisms of, the TRIPS Agreement expressed by U.N.
human rights bodies also demonstrate the heightened human rights scrutiny alive
136
in global health today.
The HIV/AIDS pandemic also raised the profile of civil and political rights
in public health policy, 137 and developments in the last decade, particularly
policy responses to bioterrorism, 138 have solidified the importance of thinking
about the impact of public health actions on such rights. One of the main
sources of discourse on the public health-human rights linkage has been the
potential need to resurrect quarantine and isolation as public health tools to deal
with dangerous epidemics, whether caused by bioterrorism or naturally
occurring infectious diseases. The resort to quarantine and isolation in SARS
containment proved that civil and political rights are important issues to consider
in global health governance.13 9 The public health responses necessary in dealing
with avian influenza, such as destruction of poultry flocks, have also raised the
importance of compensating owners for the destruction of their property in the
140
public interest, an outcome supported by the human right to property.
Thus, we can discern another important function for global health
governance in the early twenty-first century-scrutinizing policies and actions of
state, intergovernmental, and non-state actors that affect public health against

134. For the first report of the Special Rapporteur, see Paul Hunt, Report of the Special
Rapporteur: The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical
and Mental Health, U.N. ESCOR, 59th Sess., Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/58 (Feb. 13,
2003),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/9854302995c2c86fc1256
cec005al8d7.
135. One of the most prominent NGOs to campaign in this area has been Mgdecins Sans
Frontieres (Doctor's Without Borders). See MSF Access Website, The Campaign for Access to
Essential Medicines (recognizing that the Campaign is to provide access to essential medicines in those
countries where the Doctors Without Borders perform services), at http://www.accessmedmsf.org/campaign/campaign.shtm (last visited at July 7,2004). ,
136. See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 48-51 (2004) (analyzing UN
human rights challenges to the TRIPS Agreement).
137. See generally GOsTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 129 at 12-27 (analyzing civil and political
rights and the AIDS pandemic).
13& See Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far are Limitations on
Personaland Economic Liberties Justified?,55 FLA. L. REV. 1105, 1110-28 (2003) (discussing the risk
of bioterrorism threat in an analysis of the justified level of human rights restrictions for safety).
139. For analysis of the use of quarantine and isolation in the SARS outbreak, see Lawrence 0.
Gostin et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed by SARS: Implicationsfor the Control of Severe
Infectious Disease Threats, 290 JAMA 3229, 3230-31, 3233-35 (2003); Mark A. Rothstein et al.,
Quarantineand Isolation-Lessons Learned from SARS: A Report to the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 3 INST. FOR BIOETHICS,

HEALTH

POL'Y & L. 1 (Dec. 2003), available at

http://www.louisville.edu/medschool/ibhpl/ presentations.htm; Jason W. Sapsin et al., SARS and
InternationalLegal Preparedness,77 TEMPLE L. REV. 155 (2004).
140. Fidler, Global Outbreak of Avian Influenza A (H5N1) and InternationalLaw, supra note 2.
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principles of international human rights law.
C. Implications of the ConstitutionalOutlines of Global Health Governance
The four functions emerging in the globalization of public health
governance suggest that global health governance is developing structural
features and substantive objectives that parallel what happened in the
federalization of public health governance in the United States. Drawing
parallels between trends in U.S. constitutional governance and global
governance represents an attempt to discern some structural and substantive
coherency in the profound and radical changes that have emerged in the
governance of public health in international relations.
Analyses of "global governance" and "global health governance" often
dwell, for good reason, on the new multiplicity of actors in post-Westphalian
politics. These analyses often lack a sense of what the multiplicity of new actors
and their networks represents beyond the breakdown of the old Westphalian
order. At times, post-Westphalian trends might appear to herald the end of
power politics and the beginning of a progressive "new medievalism"' 141 with
emancipatory potential for humanity. At other moments, post-Westphalianism
looks chaotic, cacophonic, and inchoate, a situation in which the strong find new
ways to dominate the weak.
The emergence of security, commerce, preparedness and support, and
human rights functions in global health governance points to neither
emancipation nor neo-Westphalianism.
Rather, these functions reflect
pragmatism in health governance that seeks to balance interests and values in a
globalizing world. Behind these functions is the development of three global
understandings that provide the foundation for the post-Westphalian public
health governance now emerging.
The first global understanding concerns the acknowledgement of new geotechnological realities. The global responses to SARS and avian influenza
reflect a growing appreciation that the globalization of transportation, trade, and
information technologies has permanently. altered the politics of public health.
China's humiliation during the SARS outbreak, and Thailand's and Indonesia's
embarrassment in the avian influenza crisis, are the death rattles of old-school
Westphalianism in the new geo-technological environment of public health.
The ease with which the WHO's use of nongovernmental sources of
information in global surveillance became standard operating procedure without
a formal change in the applicable international legal framework provides
another example of the resignation of states to technological transformations
that are futile to fight. The unprecedented levels of country reporting to the
WHO that have been seen in the SARS and avian influenza outbreaks, for which
there is no basis in international law, also underscore that states have concluded
that a "new way of working" has been forced upon them.
The second global understanding involves recognition that the new geo141. See BULL, supra note 8, at 245, 254-57 (discussing the concept of new medievalism).
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geo-biological
unprecedented
produce
realities
technological
from
its
population
interconnectedness. A country's interest in protecting
of
context
infectious disease epidemics requires, in the new geo-technological
respects,
public health, an expanded conceptualization of that interest. In some
this idea is not new because public health experts have long argued that public
health governance requires international cooperation. Recent infectious disease
crises have, however, hammered home how interconnected human populations
are in the early twenty-first century. As diseases that jump from animal species
to humans, SARS and avian influenza also demonstrate how interconnected
human and animal populations are. Geo-biological interconnectedness of such
intensity creates a pragmatic solidarity of interests and values concerning public
health.
Geo-biological interconnectedness requires governance if pragmatic
solidarity is to have traction in the face of accelerating geo-technological change.
The third global understanding is awareness of the need for governance
integration in the new geopolitics of public health. Just as public health
governance between the federal government and the states of the Union has
become more vertically integrated through a process of federalization, the
distinction between national and international governance has fragmented
(In this sense, federalization and
through the process of globalization.
globalization of public health governance are interdependent phenomena.)
Integration develops in global health governance through the four
"constitutional" functions, which provide a platform for the evolution within
"networked anarchy" of a post-Westphalian body politic or commonwealth for
public health.
D. Deficienciesin, and Vulnerabilitiesof, Public Health's "New World Order"
My assertion that a post-Westphalian public health commonwealth is
emerging, grounded the four "constitutional" functions, does not pretend that
this commonwealth is sustainable. The vertical reallocation of power within
constitutional governance in the United States is more robust than the
integration of governance in the anarchical environment of international
relations. Anarchy creates deficiencies in, and vulnerabilities for, public health's
new world order that do not appear in U.S. constitutional governance.
Comprehensive discussion of these deficiencies and vulnerabilities is beyond this
article's scope, but let me mention a few concerns.
In terms of deficiencies, one could compare the successful containment of
SARS and the unchecked rampage of HIV/AIDS in the developing world and
argue that the new world order still reflects the strategic priorities of the old
world order, that is, the interests of the great powers. The "constitutional"
functions of security, commerce, preparedness and response, and human rights
weigh heavily in favor of developed countries' interests in their national security,
their economic opportunities, their public health capabilities, and their
conception of human rights. The human suffering and societal devastation
wrought by infectious diseases in the developing world may suggest the human
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rights function is hollow, or geared toward civil and political rights rather than
taking the right to health seriously. One might add that the mixture of functions
in global health governance disadvantages the attempts to -include equity and
justice as governance functions in the post-Westphalian public health
commonwealth.
: The role of the great powers also looms as a vulnerability of contemporary
post-Westphalianism. Such powers have, by definition, disproportionate power
that does not drain away under the global understandings described above. In
fact, as I argued in connection with the aftermath of SARS, the current postWestphalian context in some ways enhances the power of strong states,
especially with respect to the financial and other resources required to retrofit
national and global public health preparedness and response capabilities. 142
Making the post-Westphalian public health commonwealth work on a
sustainable basis will take material resources only to be found within the
sovereign control of the great powers. Unlike the U.S. federal government, the
global public health commonwealth has no "power of the purse" among its
"constitutional" functions to pay for what global health governance requires.
The lack of sufficient resources is, and has long been, an Achilles heel for global
health efforts, as illustrated by the WHO's chronic shortage of funds, low levels
of foreign aid from developed states for health improvements in developing
countries, and financial problems afflicting the Global Fund, 143 the Roll Back
Malaria campaign, 144 and the "3 by 5" Initiative. 45 The federalization of public
health governance has not proved cheap, and neither will the sustainability of
global health governance.
V. FROM OUTLINES

TO PILLARS? PROSPECTS FOR THE POST-WESTPHALIAN
PUBLIC HEALTH COMMONWEALTH

My assertion that "constitutional outlines" are emerging to structure global
health governance means that prospects for public health's new world order are
tied, for better or worse, to the fate of these outlines. Will the four functions of
the new governance system solidify into pillars for the post-Westphalian public
health commonwealth, or will these outlines become faint or inaudible echoes of
a world that might have been?
In thinking about the future of governance regimes concerning global public
health, it is important to recall that previous innovations have not proved
sustainable, as illustrated by the fate of the Westphalian IHR and the post-

142. FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE, supra note 1, at 174-

79.
143. Id. at 68 (describing the financial difficulties experienced by the Global Fund).
144. Vasant Narasimban & Amir Attaran, Roll Back Malaria? The Scarcity of InternationalAid
for MalariaControl, MALARIA JOURNAL (April 15, 2003), at http://www.malariajournal.com/content/
2/1/8.
145. See Press Briefing by Stephen Lewis, UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS
in Africa, at http://www.data.org/archives/000393.php (Mar. 3, 2004) (warning by UN Special Envoy
for AIDS in Africa that WHO's "3 by 5" Initiative is suffering from lack of funding).
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Westphalian Health for All vision. 146 The promising developments in global
health governance seen in the SARS and avian influenza outbreaks must be
balanced by the continuing disaster of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, for which no
extant governance concept appears to have a credible strategy.
Another cautionary note emerges from the realization that the
"constitutional outlines" for global health governance have appeared against the
background of worsening conditions for public health around the world. In
other words, but for the perilous condition of public health globally, these
functions would not have emerged to provide structure for global health
governance. Although the same holds true for the process of federalization in
U.S. constitutional governance, such a parallel is hardly comforting in
contemplating the prospects for an embryonic transformation in how public
health is governed globally.
After watching the global response to the avian influenza crisis unfold, I will
venture to argue that prospects for the emerging system of global health
governance will improve if serious multi-country threats continue to occur. The
avian influenza outbreak has reinforced governance lessons learned during
SARS. More outbreaks will groove global health governance more deeply into
the pattern of political behavior in states, intergovernmental organizations, and
non-state actors.
As mere outlines, each of the four governance functions contains ambiguity,
the clarification of which will influence the prospects for the sustainability of
global health governance. How broadly, for example, will "security" be defined
in the pursuit of global health security? 'Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have
different security interests vis-A-vis infectious diseases than the bioterrorismfocused United States. How will the post-Canctin pursuit of bilateral and
regional trade agreements by developed countries affect the7 dynamics of
14
balancing trade and health through the global commerce clause?
What balance should be struck in supporting public health preparedness
and response between infectious and non-communicable diseases, the latter of
which pose different governance challenges nationally and globally? With global
48
morbidity and mortality from non-communicable diseases on the'rise, how will
146. For analysis of previous governance innovations in infectious disease control that suffered
from various problems, see FIDLER, SARS, GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISEASE,

supra note 1, at 157-62.
147. The pursuit of regional and bilateral free trade agreements by the United States has raised
concerns that the United States may use these agreements to water down the public health safeguards
found in the TRIPS Agreement and reinforced by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health. See, e.g., Oxfam America, TRIPS-Plus Provisions, at http://www.oxfamamerica.
org/advocacy/art5391.html (last visited July 7, 2004) (stating that the United States "has pressured
trading partners to agree to provisions in regional and bilateral trade agreements that mandate even
higher levels of IP protection than those they agreed to under TRIPS. Developing countries are thus
required under these trade agreements to include very high levels of protection in their national laws,
with grave consequences for public health and other national policy objectives.").
148. See generally Robert Beaglehole & Derek Yach, Globalisation and the Prevention and
Control of Non-Communicable Disease: The Neglected Chronic Diseases of Adults, 362 LANCET 903

(2003) (discussing the rising tide of non-communicable diseases including 56 million deaths globally in
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the four functions, which are closely connected to infectious disease governance,
be utilized or revised to deal with non-communicable disease problems; from
tobacco-related diseases to diseases linked to obesity?
The human rights function is perhaps the weakest of the four functions
structuring global health governance, which creates uncertainty about its role in
the evolution of the post-Westphalian public health commonwealth. Will this
function become a morally compelling but politically ignored mantra; as perhaps
has been the fate of the global human rights strategy on HIV/AIDS? 149 What
theoretical and practical implications will efforts to revisit civil and political
rights vis-A-vis quarantine and isolation or to reinvigorate the human right to
health in global health governance have?
The existence of many questions about the future of global health
governance highlights the challenges that await the post-Westphalian public
health commonwealth. Other articles in this symposium issue explore the
challenges to post-Westphalian public health, 150 so I will not prolong my analysis
in this regard but conclude my remarks with a general observation:
The prospects for global health governance will be determined by the
progress achieved under the public health preparedness and response function.
The objectives of security, commerce, and human rights depend on robust,
sustainable national and global systems of disease surveillance and response.
Without such systems, security, trade, and individual rights will be compromised
globally. The same is true for prospects for the federalization of public health
governance in the United States, which again highlights the integration of public
health governance caused by geo-biological interconnectedness created by geotechnological realities.
Public health preparedness and response capabilities require more than
adoption of the revised IHR, which, as presently worded, would require WHO
member states to develop and maintain the capacity to detect, report, and
respond effectively to public health risks and events potentially constituting
151
public health emergencies of international concern present in its territory.
The proposed revision of the IHR spells out the core capacity requirements for
surveillance and response 152 but does not contain a strategy for assisting

2003).
149. For analysis of the role of human rights in global public health in this symposium issue, see
Sofia Gruskin, Is There a Government in the Cockpit: A Passenger's Perspective, or Global Public
Health: The Role of Human Rights, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 313 (2004).

150. See Obijiofor Aginam, Between Isolationism and Mutual Vulnerability: A South-North
Perspective on Global Governance of Epidemics in an Interdependent World, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 297
(2004) (exploring "the challenges of global governance of transnational epidemics in an. interdependent world" and arguing for a "reconfiguration of transnational health governance structures
based on an inclusive human globalism"); Susan K. Sell, The Quest for Global Governance in
Intellectual Property and Public Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions, 77
TEMPLE L. REV. 363 (2004) (analyzing the conflict between trade, public health, and intellectual
property in the realm of global governance).
151. IHR Draft Revision, supra note 97, at 7,9.
152. Id., Annex 1, at 25-27.
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in achieving this minimal level of
countries, technically or financially, 153
preparedness and response competence.
Such a strategy must be fueled by political motivations sufficiently strong in
the anarchical context of international relations to sustain public health
preparedness and response capabilities nationally and globally for decades. The
security, commerce, and human rights functions represent three compelling
motivations that can potentially sustain governance in the post-Westphalian
public health commonwealth. The governance integration mandated by geobiological interconnectedness, which is triggered by geo-technological realities,
perhaps creates a global geopolitical dynamic that will ensure public health's
"new world order" avoids becoming hegemonic, utopian, or irrelevant.

153. WHO is formulating a strategy to help strengthen national-level public health capacity. See
DISEASE SURVEILLANCE &
RESPONSE, at http://www.who.int/csr/labepidemiology/en/ (last visited July 7, 2004) (describing its
program on capacity development, which is designed to strengthen "the capacity of countries to
contain epidemics, emerging diseases and drug resistance and so ultimately, contributes to global
health security."). See also WHO, Global Consultation on Strengthening National Capacities for
Surveillance, Response and Control of Communicable Diseases: Summary and Recommendations,
WHO, Health Security Capacity Development, COMMUNICABLE

COMMUNICABLE DISEASE SURVEILLANCE & RESPONSE, at http://www.who.int/csr/labepideniology/

projects/recommendations/enprint.html (Oct. 22-24, 2003) (discussing tools necessary for "effective
regional and global surveillance).
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